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ABSTRACT 
 
 The slow progress of multilateral trade liberalization under auspices of 
the WTO led to the revival of interest in bilateral and regional free trade 
arrangements elsewhere. This new mechanism of trade liberalization forced 
Southeast Asian countries (mostly developing countries) to alter their trade policy 
strategies to draw alongside the globalist (developed countries especially United 
States and EU). This phenomenon invited debates on various issues related to free 
trade between developed and developing countries.  
 By utilizing bilateral free trade agreement between Thailand and 
Malaysia with Japan as case studies, this thesis embarks on a comparative analysis 
of the two countries‘ responses, in particular responses made by government 
officials and societal actors (industrial players and business groups) on the 
negotiation process of each agreement in perspective of protection of strategic key 
industrial sectors. With past industrial policies which were implemented to foster 
domestic industries in their hand, both countries negotiated in opening up their 
domestic market which largely influenced the industries‘ competitiveness.  
 The study of JTEPA and JMEPA shows that relationship exists between 
the objectives and nature of past industrial policies (state-led/private-led 
development model) and responses made by government officials and societal 
actors on free trade. Malaysia‘s case revealed that high governments‘ involvement 
in business, with less emphasis on the roles of private, led to intensive efforts 
made by government‘s officials‘ in retaining past protective industrial policies and 
minimal opposition efforts made by the said societal actors. Whilst, minimal 
governments‘ involvement and high emphasis on private sectors resulted in more 
liberal response from Thai officials and rigorous opposition efforts made by its 
societal actors in keeping for their interests.             
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are widely discussed by policy makers, 
politicians, economists as well as the public at large. Nowadays, it becomes a 
trend for countries to rush in their negotiating and concluding for FTAs 
irrespective of their status. This clearly shows the importance of an FTA as a 
crucial element in trade policy. Traditionally, an FTA can be described as an 
agreement between two countries or a regional grouping aiming at the elimination 
or reduction of tariffs or non-tariff barriers between them or this can simply be 
described as ‗market opening‘ among participating countries. However, from this 
traditional definition, FTAs have developed to a broader concept of deeper 
agreements (―new age‖ FTAs) which go beyond tariff elimination/reduction to 
include creation of regulations in new areas such as investment in services, 
competition policy, economic cooperation, government procurement, intellectual 
property rights (IPR) and the movement of natural persons.  
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All FTAs are preferential in nature as only signatory parties or members 
benefit from the consequence of the agreement. Therefore, some view that the 
FTAs incur de facto discrimination against trade partners who are non-members 
and thus will distort trade while others view that FTAs promote liberalization 
which creates trade. It is a never ending debate whether an FTA is a building 
block or a stumbling block to the multilateral trading system of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The WTO does recognize FTAs in Article 24 of General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
 
and Article 5 of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS). FTAs are exempted from the fundamental principle 
of most-favored nation (MFN) rules as pursued by the WTO under Article 1 of 
GATT.
1
 ―This exception is allowed as long as the FTAs meet three criteria; trade 
barriers are to be abolished for substantially all trades, trade barriers must not be 
raised higher than they were before integration and regional integration must be 
completed within a reasonable length of time‖ (Urata, 2002).   
 
 
                                                          
1
 MFN means that every time a country lowers a trade barrier or opens up a market, it has to do so 
for the same goods or services from all its trading partners — whether rich or poor, weak or 
strong. 
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According to WTO, ―the surge in RTAs has continued unabated since the 
early 1990s‖.2 Until July 2009, 249 agreements were in force. The breakdown of 
these agreements before and after inauguration of the WTO is shown in Table 1. 
Of these RTAs, the FTAs account for 60 per cent with 149 FTAs were notified 
and in forced. 
Table 1: Regional trade agreements notified to the GATT/WTO and in force 
by type of Agreement 
Agreement GATT 
(1948-1994) 
WTO  
(1995–July 2009) 
Total 
Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) 
21 128 149 
Economic Integration 
Agreement (EIA) 
7 61 68 
Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTA) 
9 4 13 
Custom Union 9 10 19 
Total 46 203 249 
 Source: Compilation from WTO RTAs database - The Regional Trade Agreements Information 
System (RTA-IS).  http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx 
 
 
The breakdown of the Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference in 1999 and 
slow pace in trade liberalization negotiations under the Doha Round with the 
                                                          
2
 The WTO website on Regional trade agreements (RTA) 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. RTA includes PTA, FTA, custom 
union and EIA. 
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collapse of the Cancun Ministerial Conference in September 2003 revealed the 
problems faced by the WTO in pursuing multilateral trade negotiations. These 
further promoted bilateral or regional FTAs as an alternative to multilateralism. 
Consequently, bilateral and regional FTAs are foreseeing as more expeditious and 
advantageous compared to the WTO multilateral negotiations as they make 
possible for contracting parties to promptly and flexibly negotiate, thus forming 
new economic rules by taking into account their actual economic conditions. 
Taken into effect in respect also to the rules of various areas of which are not yet 
covered or difficult to reach agreement on under the WTO multilateral 
negotiations such as investment in services and IPR. 
  
In East Asia, the earliest FTA began with the formation of regional free 
trade area of Southeast Asian nations or ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 
1992 to counter the power of other trading blocs in other regions such as the 
European Union (EU) in Europe, and the North America Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) in America. AFTA would be fully implemented between its regional 
members with 0% import duty by 2010 for ASEAN 6 (Singapore, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Brunei) and 2015 for Cambodia, Laos, 
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Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV). Among the Southeast Asian countries, 
Singapore had led in bilateral trade agreements with its first bilateral FTA with 
New Zealand in 2000. However, its bilateral FTA with Japan - the Singapore - 
Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (SJEPA), in 2002 is considered as the 
most notable FTA in the region as it involved the ‗new age‘ concept of FTA, 
which was named as an Economic Partnership Agreement or EPA. This EPA was 
also remarked as a trigger point for other ASEAN members to start shifting their 
trade strategies from multilateralism to bilateralism. Thailand, for instance, 
followed suit by signing its first comprehensive bilateral FTA with Australia in 
2003. This development further made other ASEAN members to consider 
bilateral FTAs as part of their new trade policies.  
 
Besides AFTA, ASEAN on its own and its member countries individually 
signed bilateral FTAs with Japan. To date, ASEAN collectively and its five major 
countries individually, had engaged in various bilateral FTAs with partners within 
or outside the East Asian region as shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Southeast Asia’s FTAs  
Country Implemented/signed Under negotiation 
ASEAN ASEAN-China (2003) 
ASEAN-Korea (2006) 
ASEAN-Japan (2008) 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand 
(2009) 
ASEAN-India (2009) 
ASEAN-EU (2008) 
Singapore Singapore-New Zealand (2001) 
Singapore-Japan (2002) 
Singapore-Europe (2003) 
Singapore-Australia (2003) 
Singapore-US (2004) 
Singapore-Jordan (2005) 
Singapore-India (2005)  
Singapore-Trans-Pacific (2006)* 
Singapore-Korea (2006) 
Singapore-Panama (2006) 
Singapore-GCC (2008)**   
Singapore-Peru (2009) 
Singapore-China (2009) 
Singapore-Mexico (2000) 
Singapore-Pakistan (2005) 
Singapore-Canada (2007) 
Singapore-Ukraine (2007) 
Singapore-Chile (2007) 
 
Thailand Thailand-New Zealand (2004) 
Thailand-Australia (2005) 
Thailand-Japan (2007) 
 
Thailand-Bahrain FA (2002) 
Thailand-India FA (2003) 
Thailand-Peru FA (2003) 
Thailand-US (2006) 
Malaysia Malaysia-Japan (2006) 
Malaysia-Pakistan (2008) 
 
Malaysia-India (2008) 
Malaysia-US (2006) 
Malaysia-Australia (2005) 
Malaysia-Chile (2006) 
Malaysia-New Zealand 
(2005) 
Philippines Philippines-Japan (2008) Philippines-US 
Philippines-Pakistan 
Philippines-China 
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Country Implemented/signed Under negotiation 
Indonesia Indonesia-Japan (2008) Indonesia-New Zealand 
Indonesia-Australia 
Indonesia-India 
Source: Compilation by author from various government websites. 
* Singapore-Trans-Pacific – Singapore, Brunei, Chile and New-Zealand 
**Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates 
 
ASEAN has formed AFTA in creating its own regionally integrated market 
where there is a free flow of goods in the region which in turn would promote and 
enhance intra-ASEAN trade. At that time, ASEAN concerned that the formation of 
other regional free trade areas would create disadvantage to ASEAN countries. 
Products from ASEAN would be uncompetitive as they would not enjoy any 
preferential treatment compared with signatory countries of the respective region. 
Despite fostering AFTA, ASEAN also did recognize the importance of its other 
economic partners. With intensification in efforts for East Asian regionalism 
especially under regional economic cooperation and integration through ASEAN+3, 
ASEAN started to look for possibilities of having FTAs with China, Japan and 
Korea.  
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By setting aside concern about potential economic damages posted by 
China, on 4 November 2002, ASEAN signed the Framework Agreement of 
ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation as an important foundation 
for East Asian regionalism. This Framework Agreement, which came into force on 
1 July 2003, was an umbrella agreement which provided general provisions on the 
establishment of an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) within 10 years, 
with special and differential treatments and flexibility for the newer ASEAN 
members. ACFTA, like AFTA, was relatively a ‗simple agreement‘ with limited 
coverage in areas for liberalization. Consequently, following Japan‘s initiatives and 
its concern about the importance of securing investment from its major foreign 
investors and trading partners, ASEAN collectively signed the Framework of 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) on 8 October 
2003. Compared to ACFTA, AJCEP was a comprehensive agreement which 
covered a wider scope by including services, investment, economic cooperation 
and dispute settlement mechanism. In addition to AJCEP, ASEAN signed the 
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN 
and Korea (AKFTA) on 13 December 2005. With the AKFTA, ASEAN accomplished 
its efforts for economic integration with the three major countries of Northeast Asia.  
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Despite attempts made by ASEAN in negotiating and concluding bilateral 
FTAs, its individual member country at the same time pursued FTAs with 
partners outside the ASEAN region. As an alternative way for quicker trade 
liberalization to sustain its economic prosperity and also to compensate for the 
financial crisis-affected AFTA market, Singapore, sooner than other ASEAN 
members, shifted its emphasis from multilateral trade expansion within ASEAN 
to a series of bilateral FTAs with non-ASEAN countries by negotiating and 
signing various FTAs with many major powers of most advanced economies like 
Japan, the United States, and Australia. Being compelled to follow Singapore, 
Thailand also started to consider advantages held by bilateral FTAs to its 
economy, and changed its stance by negotiating and concluding FTAs with 
extra-regional partners. Thailand signed its first FTA with Australia in April 2004.  
 
The move in the pioneer FTA agreement between Singapore and Japan 
became a contentious issue for ASEAN. Few members especially Malaysia who 
still preferred for the multilateral and regional trade liberalization pursued by the 
WTO and AFTA, criticized Singapore as they believed that FTA‘s ratification 
with non-ASEAN members was an indication of relative loss of interests in the 
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home region which would further harm AFTA and impede ASEAN cooperation. 
For Malaysia, any bilateral FTAs should not be initiated, negotiated or concluded 
without the ASEAN consensus. However, this resistance had only short life and 
was altered along with intensified FTA proliferations elsewhere. Malaysia, for 
instance, dropped its vehement opposition of these cross-regional FTAs for fear of 
‗missing out‘ or being ‗left out the boat‘ and changed its stance towards FTAs to 
its new trade strategies by signing its first bilateral FTA with Japan on 13 
December 2005. The same fear of isolation also forced other ASEAN members 
like the Philippines and Indonesia to follow suit and started to consider bilateral 
FTAs as a new tool in their trade policy where the Philippines and Indonesia 
respectively signed their first FTAs, both with Japan on 9 September 2006 and 20 
August 2007. 
 
Notwithstanding efforts made in fostering trade through their engagement in 
FTAs, many Southeast Asia countries are facing difficulties in balancing its foreign 
trade policy with their domestic policy. The protection of specific industries has made 
tough for them in negotiating for FTAs. Many of these countries are forced to make 
structural adjustment into their domestic policy to reap the benefits of FTAs.  
11 
 
In generating their domestic economic growth, many Southeast Asian 
countries opted to develop their own strategic sectors as the key industries. 
Therefore, various industrial policies were formulated and adopted by respective 
governments. According to Kelly (1988: 15), ―industrial policy is broadly defined 
as the deliberative attempt by the government to influence the composition of 
nation‘s industrial output where it encompasses all government actions to foster 
activity in specific sectors‖. Further, these industrial policies that aspired to 
promote the selected key industries are likely contradicted with trade policy that 
pursues trade liberalization. This situation further placed difficulties for 
government officials in deciding the best for their nation as any decision made 
would have positive and negative implications to their own domestic industries. In 
relation to this, societal actors who gained benefits from particular industrial 
policies i.e in the form of protection are also likely to oppose any decision made 
by the government to remove protective measures which shielded them from 
import competition. 
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1.2 Objectives of the Research 
It is noted that the success of major Southeast Asian countries (except 
Singapore) in achieving fast economic growth was mainly based on the 
transformation of their main ‗economic generator‘ from the agricultural sector to 
the industrial sector. Various industrial policies have been formulated by the 
respective government in fostering their industrial sectors to improve their 
economic power. Therefore, in doing so, many of these countries adopted 
different approaches when dealing with trade liberalization promoted by FTAs. 
For example, Malaysia with direct governments‘ involvement in certain strategic 
industries, assumed for the protective approach. Whilst, Thailand with no direct 
governments‘ involvement or investment in specific strategic industries, assumed 
for the liberal approach towards trade liberalization under FTAs with less 
protection granted to the industries.  
 
To further nurture the industrial sectors, Southeast Asian countries did 
realize the need to retain access to the international market. In doing so, most of 
them engaged in FTAs in order to gain preferential treatment for market access of 
their exported goods. As the numbers of FTAs accelerated and the fear of lose 
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jolted, these countries responded to the new phenomenon by gradually negotiating 
and signing FTAs. These FTA involvements, however, came with many 
consequences. In reaping the benefits of the ‗give and take‘ situation, many of 
these Southeast Asian countries are requested to open-up their own domestic 
markets for imported goods which in turn created predicament for domestic 
industries especially those that were uncompetitive or still struggling at nascent 
stage. 
 
Thus far, the rapid increase of FTAs in Southeast Asia has drawn attention 
from many scholars to examine its causes and effects. A few studies have also 
been conducted to observe the motivation and influential factors of the FTA 
initiation. However, not much observation has been done on the factors which 
could influence the negotiation process of the FTAs, especially at the country 
specific level of the Southeast Asian region. Therefore, this dissertation is 
conducted with the objective to know the kind of industrial policies adopted by 
Southeast Asia countries and to further explore how the factors in relation to 
trends toward fostering or developing specific industrial sectors influence the 
negotiation process of an FTA. 
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1.3 Significance of the Research 
The Southeast Asian countries have few similarities. In terms of industrial 
development, many of these countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
the Philippines implemented both import substitution and export promotion 
policies. However, in implementing the policies, different approaches have been 
adopted by the respective government depending on their degree of protection and 
liberalization of domestic industries. These differences could clearly be seen in 
the governments‘ moves towards the automotive industry which could be 
regarded as a vital sector to their national economic development strategies. In 
this sense, Malaysia as compared to the other Southeast Asia countries, notably 
Thailand, had a distinct approach in automotive development policies. 
Abdulsomad (1999: 275) stated that ―diversity emerged after the 1980s when 
Malaysia with a state-led approach, adopted its new automobile industrial 
development policy with the commencement of the ‗national car‘ project which 
transformed Malaysia from vehicle importers and assemblers into a full-pledged 
car manufacturers while Thailand with a private-led approach, remained as 
vehicle assemblers‖.  
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This movement required Malaysia to undertake the fullest efforts to 
protect its automotive industry to ensure the fruitfulness of the industry. In 
contrast with Malaysia, Thailand, which left the development of the automotive 
industry in the hand of private sectors and has no direct involvement in the 
industry, made less effort to protect the industry and preferably choose 
liberalization to enhance the industry‘s competitiveness. This different approach, 
i.e protectionist or liberalist, has further transmitted in their FTA negotiations‘ 
stance. The Philippines and Indonesia, despite having no national cars, also had a 
tendency to protect its local assemblers in fostering the automotive industries. 
 
In gaining the economic and political advantages of FTAs, many of 
Southeast Asian countries hurriedly joined the FTA bandwagon without vigilance 
and readiness. These created troubles during the negotiation process of the FTAs 
and raised concerns of many interest groups especially those directly affected by 
the FTAs. The mandate for successfully negotiated and concluded FTAs placed 
the government negotiating team in difficulties as to come up to a ‗win-win‘ 
situation, they needed to accept certain requests from FTA partners to open up 
their market in targeted sectors which still shielded with protection measures. By 
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accepting the requests, the government would deposit risk to their domestic 
market. This in turn would negatively affect domestic industrial players and create 
frustration among them towards government‘s policies on FTAs. The societal 
groups which represented the industries would react towards any commitments 
made by the government. Those enjoyed fruits from government policies of 
protective measures would oppose such policies‘ removal whilst those who would 
get benefit from its lifting support the move.   
 
As various bilateral FTAs are currently implemented and negotiated by 
Southeast Asian countries, it is crucial to analyze how influential factors in relation to 
the protective trends of industrial policy influence the negotiation process of an FTA. 
This research is inclined to study the influence of two major factors towards the FTA 
process in relation to the trends to foster or develop a specific industrial sector. On part 
of government officials, it is very crucial for them as policy-makers to fully aware of 
their own domestic industrial policy before negotiating for any FTAs to minimize the 
negative effects of those FTAs and to ensure that any FTA engagement is in line with 
their domestic industrial policy which will benefit domestic industries in return. For 
societal actors, involvement of those related to specific targeted industrial sectors will 
17 
 
influence the FTA process where these groups will pressure the government to make 
wise decision in negotiating for FTAs. The findings of this research may provide useful 
guidance for policy makers in their future prescriptions for potential bilateral or 
regional FTAs.  
 
To accomplish this research, I will examine the relationship between 
industrial policies and trade policies in two Southeast Asian countries, Thailand 
and Malaysia by giving focus on the protective trends of past industrial policies 
along the negotiation process of bilateral FTAs. 
 
1.4 Limitation of the Research 
 
The study of protection in industrial sectors especially in FTA‘s 
negotiations is a complex issue and widely confidential in nature. Therefore, I 
found that it was relatively hard for me to gather primary data from government‘s 
documents. In addition to this, a fieldwork (including interviews) only confined to 
Malaysia in collecting primary data. A similar fieldwork was not carried out in 
Thailand due to time and financial constraint. Therefore, this study heavily relied 
on secondary sources gained from books, journals, newspapers and internet. This 
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limitation created difficulties for this researcher in accomplishing in-depth and 
meaningful research. The lack of reference materials on previous studies and 
researcher‘s experience in the research area also limit the sources for gathering 
valuable information and ability to produce a high standard outcome for this 
research.  
 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
 This thesis is organized and structured into five chapters. Chapter one 
provides a brief introduction on area of my study and also the development of 
FTAs at various levels, East Asia, ASEAN and individual Southeast Asian 
countries. Chapter two looks at past relevant literature on FTAs in general and 
FTAs involving Southeast Asia and Japan in order to gather broad-spectrum ideas 
on the scope of the study. This chapter also provides analytical frameworks of this 
research. The following Chapter three and Chapter four are each allocated for 
empirical analysis on the Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement and 
the Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement. Finally, Chapter five will 
conclude the thesis by providing discussions on the findings of this research. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The proliferation of bilateral FTAs intensified around the late 1990s. This 
FTA phenomenon became the subject of intense debate for many scholars. As a 
consequence, there has been an emerging number of literature in various aspects 
(economic and political economy aspects) of FTAs. As my focus is on political 
economy, literature review is carried out on previous studies of FTAs from the 
political economy‘s perspective. Following this, I will summarize the past studies 
according to FTA studies in general, studies of Southeast Asia‘s FTAs and studies 
of Japan-centered FTAs. 
 
2.2 General FTA studies 
Urata (2002) examined the conditions of the mounting inclination towards 
regionalism in the 1990s. He observed that there were few characteristics of the 
growth in FTAs. According to Urata, the FTAs were getting bigger with an 
expansion in terms of their membership; the agreements also became deeper as 
they incorporated new elements such as common rules and cooperation between 
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FTA‘s members in various areas like labor mobility, competition policy and 
intellectual property. In addition, there also an increase in agreements between 
countries that was not necessarily in geographically close such as between 
Singapore and Chile; and countries which previously reluctant to join the FTA‘s 
bandwagon such as Japan and South Korea were now willing to do so by 
negotiating and signing FTA with various partners. By using the surge in FTAs as 
a focal point, Urata elucidated why FTAs were favored by many countries rather 
than multilateral trade liberalization under the WTO. From his observation Urata 
found that ―a complex mix of external and internal factors, as well as economic, 
political and security-related factors was behind the expansion, intensification and 
diversification of RTAs‖ (Urata, 2002: 6). He held that the external and internal 
factors were the main reasons behind the proliferation of FTAs. Many countries 
were motivated to choose FTAs due to the external factors which include an 
access to overseas market and securing the existing one together with and internal 
factor which sought for domestic regulatory reform through external pressure 
brought by FTAs. Furthermore, the nature of bilateral FTAs which required less 
time to be concluded and involved fewer participants as compared to multilateral 
trade under the WTO were also contributed to the intensification of FTA‘s 
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proliferations. Urata also discussed the different type and characteristics of FTAs, 
the economic effects of FTAs including the static effects (trade creation, trade 
diversion and terms of trade) and dynamic effects (market expansion and 
competition enhancement) and their significance for the global and Japanese 
economies. He held that all the economic effects (excluding trade diversion 
effects) provided for positive developments to all FTA‘s members. He further 
asserted that ―if FTAs could expand market, enhance competition and promote 
growth by members, the benefit would not be limited to that country party to the 
FTA, but to nonmembers also‖ (Urata, 2002: 28). In assessing the significance of 
FTA to Japan, he concluded that if Japan does not vigorously take part in FTAs, 
and if persisting for agriculture‘s protection in future FTAs, there was a risk that it 
would not be regard as a worthwhile FTA partner by other countries and would 
bear the cost of being expelled from future FTAs. 
 
In relation to the rise in bilateral FTAs in East Asia and the Asia Pacific, 
Dent (2005) studied the characters and the main causes of these FTAs and 
possibility in advancing for regional cooperation and integration. He found that 
there were four reasons for the FTA‘s proliferations; the shift in countries trade 
22 
 
policy paradigm, from mercantilism to liberalism; trade institutions faltering of 
the WTO, ASEAN, APEC on moving forward with their respective trade 
liberalization agendas; the responses to the global FTA trend where they eager to 
catch up with their individual rivals from other regions to secure market access; 
and the strategic diplomatic responses to the 1997-1998 Asian financial crises 
where East Asian countries opted for the bilateral trade agreements as a means to 
cement the international economic relations in the regions. Dent further asserted 
that ―the above politico-diplomatic and political economic motives for initiating 
FTA projects have been generally more important than pure economic motives for 
the Asia-Pacific states‖ (Dent, 2005: 294-295). In observing the nature of these 
FTAs and its contribution to regional economic integration, Dent argued that the 
different and rival FTA models and modalities between the U.S ‗asymmetric 
neo-liberal‘ model and the Japanese ‗developmental-industrial‘ model 
complicated any efforts in forging for an Asia-Pacific FTA. Furthermore, 
significant barriers such as the agri-trade protectionism and economic disparities 
in the region impeded the realization for this regional FTA. 
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In addition to this, Ravenhill (2003) in his study on the new bilateralism in 
the Asia Pacific investigated why Western Pacific countries apparently changed 
their approach to trade liberalization from non-discriminatory basis 
(multilateralism) to discriminatory basis (bilateralism) and what were the likely 
effects of the proposed bilateral agreements. His study revealed that there were 
three reasons for the new interest in bilateralism in the Western Pacific countries; 
―an increasing awareness of the weakness of existing regional institutions and 
initiatives; perceptions of positive demonstration effects from regional agreements 
in other parts of the world; and changing of domestic economic interests‖ 
(Ravenhill, 2003; 300). Ravenhill argued that the consequent of the Asian 
financial crisis together with different members‘ perception on the progress of 
market liberalization of the APEC and ASEAN as well as the WTO, encouraged 
many Asia Pacific countries to divert their interests from multilateralism to 
bilateralism. He also asserted that the new interests in bilateralism was also 
augmented as pro-liberalization forces believed that these new bilateral 
agreements could be as a means of supporting the movement towards freer trade 
and would further be a foundation for a global free trade. In addition, bilateral 
FTAs ―could act as a steppingstone by gradually exposing the protected sectors to 
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the international competitions‖ (Ravenhill, 2003; 302). Ravenhill also argued that 
there were five likely effects of the FTAs; economic effects of the participant 
economies; economic effects of non-participants; effects on domestic political 
economies of the participants; effects on the existing regional organization; and 
effects on the international trade. In terms of the effects on domestic political 
economies, Ravenhill stated that unlike multilateral trade liberalization which 
required for reciprocity and tends to maximize pressure on participant countries to 
open up domestic market, bilateral FTAs did otherwise by offering less external 
pressure to its participants to engage in the reciprocal liberalization. In addition, 
the bilateral FTAs provide avenue to participant countries for selective 
liberalization. However, he affirmed that the results of the new bilateralisms were 
likely to be paltry with the participant economies especially developing countries 
only captured small gain from the agreement. This new bilateral FTAs also tend to 
force governments to remove protection on certain sectors by adopting approach 
of ―liberalization without political pain‖ (Ravenhill, 2003: 299).  
 
Ravenhill (2006) also conducted a study on the political economy of the 
new Asia-Pacific bilateralism. Based on FTAs involving East Asian countries 
25 
 
with 12 having been implemented, 15 currently under negotiation and 10 under 
study, Ravenhill found that many of these agreements have been asymmetrical 
and driven by political factors which in turn made exclusion for several sectors. 
He further argued that although this exclusion provided governments with 
political benefits, at the same time it created a new structure of protectionism that 
might harm consumers, created trade diversion and encouraged further lobbying 
by protected industries. As a result, this new bilateralism which provided a means 
to achieve liberalization without political pain encouraged protectionist interests 
and had the possibilities to undermine pro-liberalization alliances. 
 
2.3 Research on FTAs in South East Asia  
   In assessing how FTAs in Southeast Asia were essentially a means to 
secure FDI at the expense of the working class, Arnold (2006) in his study of Free 
Trade Agreements and South East Asia, held that free trade and FTAs were often 
portrayed to the people especially in the developing countries as a prescription for 
economic prosperity, promising that the domestic industry would develop in 
parallel with export market expansion. Therefore, if these developing countries 
wished to gain benefits from FTAs, they were required to make a structural 
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reform at home by liberalizing their domestic markets and get rid of all rigid trade 
obstacles in order to draw the FDI. Arnold further stated that ―structural reform is 
essentially locked into FTAs and making liberalization difficult to reverse once 
begun‖ (Arnold, 2006: 205). By using the Mexico‘s experience with the NAFTA 
and the ongoing negotiated FTA between the U.S and Thailand, he argued that 
these FTAs would give negative effects on workers especially from 
labor-intensive industries. He held that the negative effects of FTAs still apparent 
despite positive arguments (win-win arrangements) made by the participating 
countries as many developing countries still could not sustain for unprecedented 
global markets competition, FDI and ever-cheaper production. Arnold concluded 
that ―free trade, increased market integration, and FTAs were more compatible 
with the authoritarian labor control, increase poverty, job displacement, and 
weakening of the development process than with sustainable development‖ 
(Arnold, 2006: 214). 
 
Daquila and Huy (2003) analyzed Singapore‘s FTAs and asserted that 
while Singapore has always supported the encouragement of free trade at regional 
and multilateral levels, various factors had contributed to its bilateral trade policy. 
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First, the progress of the ASEAN regional integration was sluggish, beneath 
Singapore‘s anticipation for its own advantage and for the opulence of ASEAN. 
Therefore to address this issue, Singapore seeks accomplishment of its aims 
through bilateral conduits to complement its regional and multilateral trade 
liberalization initiatives. Second, ASEAN has been taken time in constructing 
free-trade linkages with the developed countries such as the United States, Japan, 
and the EU. Third, Singapore has also pushed to refine its trade policy by giving 
emphasize to bilateral trade to ensure that its companies would not seriously be 
disadvantage due to the advancement in trade liberalization and growth activities 
in the Western block with the formation of trading blocks such as NAFTA, the 
enlargement of the EU and the expected formation of a Free Trade Area of 
Americas (FTAA). Fourth, Singapore's FTAs are hoped to serve both economic 
and strategic interests, and fifth, Singapore's FTAs were supposed to advance 
market liberalization and integration and accelerate the worldwide free trade 
within the WTO framework. By using Singapore‘s bilateral FTAs with Australia 
and New Zealand, Japan and the U.S, Daquila and Huy demonstrated and asserted 
that those FTAs provided equal benefits to all signatories despite various critics 
posted to them. Furthermore, FTA with the U.S went beyond economic realities 
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as ―for Singapore, the USSFTA would signify for a continued American 
engagement in Southeast Asia that could help Singapore to balance regional 
power politics for its own national interests and survival‖ (Daquila and Huy, 
2003; 920).  
 
In examining Malaysia‘s FTA policy, Suzuki (2003) found that there were 
two important facets in Malaysia‘s policy towards FTAs; ―economic impacts of 
FTAs on its domestic industries and diplomatic aspects of FTAs that were closely 
related to its ASEAN diplomacy‖ (Suzuki, 2003: 286). Suzuki argued that it was 
not easy for Malaysia to pursue FTAs without reforms of its own protective 
industrial policy especially on the automotive sector. Due to its protective stance, 
Malaysia has delayed liberalization on the automotive products under AFTA. The 
study also concluded that Malaysia preferred to have the ASEAN-based FTAs 
rather than bilateral FTAs that received no ASEAN consensus due to its concern 
about ASEAN‘s unity and its effort in building and maintaining the ASEAN 
economic integration. Malaysia also foreseen that the ASEAN-based FTAs could 
provide more flexibility for its commitment as they helped to a certain extent 
shielded the impact of such FTAs on the domestic industries. Malaysia changed 
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its position towards bilateral FTAs with its potential FTA with Japan only after 
both ASEAN and Japan agreed on approach for bilateral FTAs among ASEAN 
members along with the realization of the regional ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement.  
 
In case of Thailand‘s FTA policy, Nagai (2003) studied on the continuity 
and change between the Chuan and Thaksin governments. The study found that 
the initiative for bilateral FTAs under the Thaksin government had come mainly 
from Prime Minister himself. Nagai also held that there were three main factors 
that motivated Thailand to seek for bilateral FTAs. Firstly, slow pace of 
liberalization under auspices of the ASEAN and the WTO especially in the 
agricultural sector. Secondly, Thailand tried to circumvent the FTA syndrome 
which created the fear of being isolated and excluded from the world by not 
participating. Thirdly, the change of the Thai government to Thaksin led to the 
formation of a new economic strategy through the implementation of the ‗dual 
track‘ policy - FTA policy and domestic policy where the FTA policy promotes 
FDI and exports while the domestic policy strengthens the domestic economy. 
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In accessing why countries particularly Thailand were so eager to establish 
bilateral and minilateral FTAs and the impact of these FTAs, Kiyota (2006) made an 
attempt by focusing his study on the political and economic aspects of Thai FTAs. His 
study found that Thailand changed the focus of its FTA‘s partners from developing 
countries to developed countries when Thai‘s supremacy was taken by Thaksin in early 
2001. This change was linked to both internal and external factors. The internal forces 
were the sluggish of the Thai economy after the Asian financial crisis and the altering 
support from domestic business circles whilst the external factors include ―the formation 
of an AFTA, implementation of the new WTO rules and policies, and competition with 
Singapore and China to attract new FDI‖ (Kiyota, 2006: 207). In analyzing the 
economic aspects of bilateral trade agreements, Kiyota used the CGE model to examine 
the impact of Thai FTAs on the Asia-Pacific economies. Based on this model of analysis, 
Kiyota established that ―the positive impact of Thai FTAs was not always guaranteed 
unless the AFTA is successfully implemented‖ (Kiyota, 2006: 227). He also assured that 
the combination of the AFTA with bilateral FTAs would be more favorable to the Thai 
economy than the geographically scattered minilateral FTAs. Kiyota asserted that 
Thailand‘s bilateral FTAs should not be considered as a main goal of Thailand‘s trade 
policy, but as a step towards multilateral trade agreements pursued by the WTO. 
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Mutebi (2004) in his study on Thailand in 2003: Riding High Again 
examined the Thai political and economic highlights in 2003. In his study, Mutebi 
found that the political and economic landscape in 2003 was dominated by Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. He affirmed that the Thaksinomics contributed to 
Thailand economic prosperity in 2003. In relation to trade policy, in particular the 
bilateral and multilateral trades, he insisted that Thaksin‘s policy was concentrated on 
securing bilateral FTAs and escalating regional groupings under ASEAN. Thailand, 
which was previously aloof itself from FTAs, vigorously pursued them in 2001, after 
Singapore signed its bilateral FTA with the United States. Mutebi held that ―the Thai 
government seems to follow Singapore‘s move and share its idea that FTAs 
particularly those with the U.S. would help provide a counterweight to China, the 
rapidly growing regional economic powerhouse‖ (Mutebi, 2004: 85). Mutebi further 
concluded that ―the combination of a fast-growing economy and strong-arm politics 
throughout 2003 created a level of stability in Thai politics‖.3 
 
From Malaysia‘s perspective, Okamoto (2006) studied changes of 
Malaysia‘s stance towards FTAs from reluctant bilateralist to new trade policy 
                                                          
3
 ibid., pg. 86. 
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strategies. According to Okamoto, there were two factors contributed to the 
change in Malaysia‘s stances toward bilateral FTAs. First, the economic costs of 
not participating or excluding from the FTAs became so large that the Malaysian 
government needed to react promptly and not to disregard them anymore. Second, 
FTAs concluded and negotiated between other ASEAN countries, particularly 
Singapore and Thailand, bothered Malaysia and made it found ways to make 
certain that its exporters were competitive and not being deprived through the 
proliferations of the recent and coming FTAs. Even though Malaysia started to 
consider for bilateral FTAs, Okamoto held that there would be various political 
obstacles in promoting these FTAs as resistance would emerge from the automobile 
and services sectors. He further concluded that ―although the promotion of bilateral 
cooperation created some gains for Malaysia, it might not became a major mode of 
trade governance‖ (Okamoto, 2006: 232). Due to the emerging resistances, Okamoto 
affirmed that a deeper agreement which was common among recent FTAs would be 
difficult to pursue for Malaysia compared to other ASEAN countries. Furthermore, 
Malaysia still preferred ASEAN-based framework rather than bilateral ones.      
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2.4 Studies of Japan-Centered FTAs 
Pempel and Urata (2006) examined Japan‘s new move towards bilateral 
FTAs and concluded that there were three major reasons on why FTAs had gained 
greater appeal in Japan; FTAs have become a major policy pursued by many other 
countries as the economic advantages to the participating countries and the 
detriments to those not participating became apparent, FTAs to assist in advancing 
domestic structural reforms in the economy, and lastly FTAs to counter the 
China‘s FTA strategy towards ASEAN and other East Asian countries. Both 
authors however held that it would not be easy for Japan to pursue bilateral FTAs 
due to its domestic political economy as ―entrenched powers have strongly 
resisted rapid economic adjustment‖ (Pempel and Urata, 2006: 92). 
  
By using Japan‘s FTAs with Mexico and the Philippines, Corning (2007) 
studied this two FTAs in the context of parallel negotiations in the Doha Round. 
From his observation he affirmed that both agreements gave advantage to Japan in 
terms of market access of its auto and steel sectors and at the same time, Japan 
managed to secure protection on its agricultural sector by providing only minimal 
access to the Mexican and Pilipino agri-products. Corning found that Japan‘s 
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approach to selective liberalization in bilateral FTAs was largely consistent with its 
approach to multilateral liberalization in the Doha Round. He held that Japan in all 
means tried to the fullest to protect its agricultural sector and limit any liberalization 
cost of this sector at both bilateral and multilateral levels. In addition to this, he 
affirmed that ―the real obstacle to progress in the Doha Round has not been a 
diversion of time and resources created by FTA‘s negotiations or an eroding belief 
in the value of multilateralism but the unwillingness of Japan and other 
industrialized countries to commit to genuine liberalization of agricultural trade at 
either the bilateral or multilateral level‖ (Corning, 2007: 51). He further ascertained 
that the prospect for increased Japanese flexibility in the multilateral agricultural 
negotiations lies in accelerated modification of the agricultural policy rather than 
lessened weight on the quest of FTAs. 
 
In this vein, Mulgan (2008) analyzed Japan‘s FTA politics and the problem 
of agricultural trade liberalization and asserted that Japan‘s eagerness to negotiate 
on FTAs was not corresponding to its readiness for agricultural trade liberalization. 
According to Mulgan, various means were employed by Japan to limit the coverage 
of agricultural compromise in any FTAs. She argued that compared to 
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liberalization mechanism pursued by the WTO, FTAs were supposedly became a 
more useful tool in liberalizing the Japanese agricultural trade ―because FTAs 
reshape the domestic politics of Japanese trade in ways that are conducive to 
further market opening‖ (Mulgan, 2008: 164). Mulgan also observed that market 
liberalization sought by FTAs ―altering the domestic politics of trade policymaking 
on the demand side as well as some aspects of the supply side‖.4 On the demand 
side, business groups which benefited from greater market access, voiced for a 
strong demand to lift protections on agricultural sector while on the supply side, the 
significance of FTAs for broader state interests are accepted by politician-leader. 
Mulgan further stated that public choice theory would envisage that the vibrant 
alteration from both side would then lead to a declining trend in agriculture 
protection through the realization of a pro-FTA policy. However, Mulgan 
anticipated that various obstacles might emerge along the policy making process 
which could obstruct ―the altered demand and supply-side dynamics from 
necessarily delivering free trade outcomes‖.5  
 
                                                          
4
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5
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Burgschweiger (2009) in her paper regarding Deeper Integration from 
Another Perspective: Trade Liberalization Imbalances within Japanese 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements concluded that ―although PTAs 
are persisted as a complement to multilateral trade negotiations aimed at the 
ultimate goal of free trade, but with their discriminative nature, PTAs had some 
potential of promoting protectionism in certain sectors or at least sub-sectors‖ 
(Burgschweiger, 2009: 13). The EPAs enabled the Japanese government to 
promote political rhetoric of assisting developing countries as well as to gain 
market access and preferential treatment serving Japanese exporters without being 
reciprocally forced to open up its own sensitive sectors.  
 
By focusing on similar issue of agricultural trade protection, Yoshimatsu 
(2006) further made good efforts to examine how domestic politics influenced the 
new Japan trade policy towards FTAs. Within the framework of bureaucrats‘ and 
politicians‘ preferences towards FTAs, he illustrated how economic and political 
linkages in East Asia had pressed Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(MAFF) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to move from their stance of 
rejection to provisional acceptance of FTAs. As FTAs emerged as a primary 
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national policy and increased commitments gained from other ministries along with 
the growing number of FTAs in East Asia, MAFF was discomforted and felt the 
necessities to react and assume for more positive position in the inter-ministry 
competition in outlining the Japan‘s FTA policy. With the increasing trends in 
current and future agricultural exports to East Asia, MAFF held upon export 
development as a primary means to rationalize the importance of FTAs to Japanese 
farmers. This change in MAFF‘s stance together with the Japanese agricultural 
groups has forced norin zoku (agricultural tribes) in the LDP to discover a fresh 
approach to support FTAs by addressing concerns of the growing shadow of China 
in East Asia and the need to counterbalance China‘s influence. 
 
In addition to this, Yoshimatsu (2005) examined how domestic societal 
actors have impinged on the evolution of Japan's trade policy toward FTAs by 
focusing on the role of Nippon Keidanren, the most influential business federation 
in Japan. It is affirmed that Keidanren has played three important roles in 
developing Japan‘s trade policy towards FTAs: as a pressure group endeavored to 
directly shape the preferences of political actors in the executive and legislative 
sectors through direct lobbying; as an information‘s provider to politicians to assist 
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them in making desirable and appropriate policy choice; and as an interest 
coordinator within private sectors, both in and outside Japan. Based on case studies 
of Japan‘s FTAs with Singapore, Mexico and South Korea, Yoshimatsu further 
analyzed policy preferences and commitments of Keidanren to the policymaking 
process and found that there were varying motivations for Keidanren's support of 
these projects such as to defend its members' commercial interests in the case of 
Mexico and to promote domestic industrial adjustment and regional economic 
integration in case of Singapore and South Korea. 
 
2.5 Assessment of Past Literature 
FTAs encouraged for quicker trade liberalization which provides wider 
trade opportunities and advantages to signatory parties, therefore many countries 
rushing to engage in FTAs to foster their trade. As a result, FTAs have thrives 
everywhere as no one wants to be left behind the others. While the government 
conducted feasibility studies of potential FTAs, then initiated, negotiated or 
concluded FTAs, concerns arose whether the new FTA-centered trade policies are 
consistent or in contrast with the domestic economic and industrial policies in 
strengthening the domestic economy.  
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Based on the survey of past literature of general FTA studies, I found that 
most of the scholars focused on the causes or reasons of FTA‘s 
initiation/involvement. The possible effects of FTAs are also discussed including 
the tendency of governments to protect certain sectors by making exclusion from 
the agreements. At the Southeast Asian level, scholars also concentrated on 
reasons why the Southeast Asian countries like Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia 
shifted towards FTAs as their new trade policies and strategies. Besides these 
studies, some studies examined the use of FTAs in securing FDI and 
consequences of these FTAs to the Southeast Asia countries.  
 
Being adherent to trade liberalization under auspices of the WTO, Japan‘s 
involvement with FTAs attracted many scholars to examine its Japan-centered 
FTAs. Many studies observed motivations which made Japan shift its focus from 
multilateralism under the WTO to bilateralism through FTAs. Alongside, a few 
scholars also assess the agriculture‘s protection trend in Japan‘s FTAs. Corning 
(2007) and Mulgan (2008) found that protection of the agricultural sector became 
an obstacle for Japan in negotiating the FTAs. Yoshimatsu (2005, 2006) went 
deeper by conducting studies on influence of state and non-state actors in 
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reshaping Japan‘s trade policy towards FTAs. In his studies, Yoshimatsu analyzed 
how these influential factors - state and non-state actors influenced the FTA 
process. Their concerns with effects of agricultural liberalization through FTAs 
have made MAFF and agricultural tribes in the LDP oppose Japan‘s FTAs moves 
at the earlier stage and conditionally accepted the FTAs after realizing the positive 
effects brought by those FTAs.  
 
By assessing these past literatures, it can be concluded that many scholars 
- Urata, 2002; Dent, 2005; Ravenhill, 2003 & 2006; Daquila & Huy, 2003; Kiyota, 
2006; Okamoto, 2006; Pempel & Urata, 2006 - focused on external and internal 
factors in understanding motivations for countries engaging in FTAs. Although 
these studies are able to show the underlying factors of countries‘ involvement, 
those factors were only be highlighted on the surface. In-depth observation has 
not been carried out on internal factors in particular at the country-specific 
domestic level. This observation is important as it would provide clearer insights 
that might be linked to domestic politics of FTAs. Though few scholars such as 
Mulgan (2008) and Yoshimatsu (2005, 2006) had made a valuable attempt to 
examine the domestic politics of FTAs with the backdrop of agricultural trade 
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protection, these studies did not go deeper to find the relationship between past 
policies and recent trend of trade policy preferences of Japan.  
 
Nevertheless, Japan‘s case showed the protection trend of specific 
industries, in particular, the agricultural sector which can be regarded as a 
sensitive sector in the FTA process. It clearly demonstrated the way on how 
bureaucrats, politicians and non-state actors reacted in protecting the agricultural 
sector along the FTA process. As most developing countries in Southeast Asia 
have their own targeted industries to be developed, this trend also might be 
applicable to these countries. The government of these countries also might 
adhere to protect specific sectors to make certain of its development. With past 
industrial policies in their hand, question arose on how these governments 
protected its specific strategic sectors and how its officials‘ preferences in 
fostering these sectors influence the FTA process. In addition to this, question also 
arose on how non-state actors/societal actors react to the FTA, what role have they 
played and whether their action influence the process of the FTA. 
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Based on past studies on Southeast Asia‘s FTAs, I found that thus far, no 
studies are conducted to observe the protection aspect of industrial policies in 
FTA‘s negotiations. Therefore, this research will make a bold attempt to fill the 
gap found in the previous literature.  
     
2.6 Research Questions 
 Southeast Asian countries had gradually adopted FTAs as their new trade 
policy strategies. Many of these countries started to alter their trade policies after 
moves made by Singapore in initiating and concluding FTAs with various 
partners outside the region. Compelled by Singapore‘s move, these countries then 
made efforts to initiate and negotiate for FTAs. However compared to Singapore 
which already fully liberalized its market, these other Southeast Asian countries 
faced difficulties to conclude the FTAs as they have industries to be considered. 
Some of the targeted key industries are highly supported by the government 
through various protective measures and incentives to make them competitive. 
Therefore, in ensuring growth at home and tapping enlargement overseas, many 
of these countries made the fullest efforts to retain domestic industrial policies. 
Based on this situation, this thesis will make an attempt to provide answers to the 
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following research questions: 
(1) What kind of industrial policies were implemented by Southeast Asian 
countries? 
(2) How have past policy trends to protect specific industrial sectors 
influence the negotiation process of an FTA. 
 
With respect to research question (2) above, I would like to provide the 
tentative hypothesis as follow: 
(1) Government official‘s preferences to continuously foster specific 
strategic sectors is the major factor that have negatively influence the 
negotiating process of an FTA; and  
(2) Domestic societal groups which benefited or affected by past industrial 
policy also conducted lobbying to pressure the government in 
protecting their interests. 
 
2.7 Research Methodology 
Both primary and secondary sources were used in gathering valuable data 
and information for this research. For the primary sources, I relied on the 
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qualitative method of data collection. Interviews with relevant government 
officials who are responsible for policy-making and who are directly involved in 
this FTA was conducted in order to gather first-hand information. In addition to 
this, primary data was also collected from government reports, statistics and other 
official documents which provided useful information on the background of these 
FTAs, related policies as well as current perspective of the issue. For the 
secondary sources, information was collected from books, book chapters, 
newspapers, journals articles as well as reliable online references.   
 
In the framework of this dissertation, a comparative analysis of Thailand 
and Malaysia‘s EPA with Japan was undertaken. Why did I choose these two 
countries in Southeast Asia and Japan as case studies for this research? Firstly, 
both countries had commenced for industrialization process almost at the same 
time i.e in the early 1960s. Secondly, under this process Thailand and Malaysia 
chose similar industries (automotive and steel) as their key strategic sectors to be 
developed. Finally, both countries officially commenced their FTA‘s negotiations 
with Japan almost at the same time which was in early 2004 but the negotiations 
were concluded at different time with Thailand required longer period of 
45 
 
discussion. The varied period of negotiations may shed some lights into difference 
of issues involved in the FTA process by taking into consideration that both of 
them negotiated for an FTA with similar partner i.e Japan. 
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CHAPTER 3: JAPAN-THAILAND ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT (JTEPA) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Thailand has a long established bilateral economic relationship with Japan. 
The bilateral trade between these two countries expanded significantly during the past 
few decades. For Thailand, Japan has been the largest trading partner where Japan 
became Thailand‘s top destination of exports and main source of imports especially 
for electrical and automotive products. Thailand also received a huge amount of FDI 
from Japan, which contributed to the economic growth of Thailand. The wellbeing of 
Thais‘ economy now depends crucially on the exports of manufactured goods made 
by Japanese affiliated plants in various sectors including automobiles and parts, 
electronics, machinery, rubber products, chemicals, and plastics. Because of Japanese 
FDI, Thailand now counts among the top ten exporters of automobiles in the world. It 
is notable that the economic relationship between Thailand and Japan developed 
rapidly following the 1985 Plaza Accord where we can see a massive investment, 
flowed from Japan into Southeast Asian countries. Though the relationship was 
impeded by the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the amount of trade and direct 
investment surged through the early 2000s.  
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Given the significant bilateral economic ties with Japan and the successful 
FTA concluded between Japan and Singapore, Thailand was inspired and eager to 
have a similar FTA with Japan to reap the benefits of free trade. Thailand foreseen 
that the FTA would further expand economic interaction with Japan as under such 
an agreement, unnecessary barriers to trade would be removed to facilitate free 
flows of goods, investment, services and persons between both countries. 
Moreover, the Thai FTA‘s policy further advanced under Prime Minister 
Thaksin‘s administration which adopted a ―dual track policy that strongly 
promotes the enhancement of international competitiveness, the expansion of 
domestic demands, and the vitalization of the grassroots economy‖ (MOFA, 
2006). 
 
However, as Thailand‘s economic growth is founded by 
import-substitution and export oriented industrialization associated with 
government protections, Thailand faced difficulties to simultaneously implement 
trade policy and industrial policy as market liberalization will only be achieved at 
the expense of domestic market. Therefore, it is interesting to examine how 
Thailand negotiated for free market with the domestic industries backed in mind. 
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In doing so, the first part of this chapter will explain Thailand‘s industrialization 
process and industrial policies, in particular, policies on key industrial sectors, 
namely the automotive and steel sectors. The second part of the chapter will then 
examine the JTEPA, in particular the negotiation process of JTEPA with the 
objective to observe how past policy trends to continuously foster Thai‘s 
automotive and steel sector influence the negotiation process by looking at the 
actions or responses of government officials and societal actors along the 
negotiation process.  
 
 3.2 Overview of Thailand’s Industrial Policy 
The Thai economy was one of the most robust in Asia. Thailand had 
enjoyed rapid economic growth especially from 1960s to mid-1990s before 
tremendously suffered from the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98. Currently, after 
the turmoil, Thailand‘s economic growth is accelerating similarly with other 
ASEAN countries. The World Bank Report on East Asian Miracle did recognize 
Thailand‘s economic achievement. The driving force behind Thailand‘s 
remarkable economic growth for the last few decades was industrialization. As a 
common model for economic development in East Asia, the Thai economic 
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structure which previously concentrated on the agriculture-based economy has 
been transformed into an industrial-based economy.  
 
According to Peamsilpakulchorn (2006: 76), ―Thai industrialization went 
through two broad phases; import substitution industrialization (ISI)
6
 and 
export-oriented industrialization (EOI)
7‖. The ISI was first promoted by the 
authoritarian government in the 1950s by adopting the state-led model. This 
economic strategy was implemented with an aim to replace/substitute the 
imported goods with domestically produced products. During this time 
concentration was given to consumer goods such as processed food and textiles. 
To attract foreign investment, the Thai government enacted the Industrial 
Promotion Act 1954, the Promotion of Industrial Investment Act 1959, and 
established the Board of Investment (BOI) in 1959 to facilitate the 
industrialization process in Thailand. The BOI was created as the sole agent for 
the promotion of industrial development, empowered to select, protect and 
                                                          
6
  The ISI is the inward-looking economic strategy where developing countries made attempts to 
replace the imported products (from industrialized countries) with products produce at home. 
7
  The EOI is the outward-looking economic strategy where the industrialization is encouraged by 
expanding exports. 
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promote targeted industries (Suehiro, 2003: 132). However, ―the ISI was not 
successfully implemented as not much industrial progress been made during the 
1950s, due in part to the absence of a consistent framework of industrial policy‖ 
(Linnemann, Dijeck & Verbruggen 1987: 297). During this period, ―the Thai 
government enacted the Industrial Promotion Act 1954 which provided tariff 
protection and tax incentives for import-substitution industries and later in the 
second half of 1950s, gradual relaxation of the existing restrictive control system 
was implemented under purview of the BOI‖. 8  
 
Only in 1960s, the Thai government started to seriously implement the ISI. 
According to Hansanti, Islam & Sheehan (2008: 48), ―official reforms of the trade 
patterns in Thailand took place in the early 1960s, alongside the establishment of 
the National Economic Development Board (NEDB), which acted as the 
government‘s economic planning agency to develop strategies to transform Thai 
economy into a global economy‖.9 In 1961, the NEDB implemented the First 
                                                          
8
 ibid. 
9 The NEDB is currently called as the National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB). 
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National Economic Development Plan (1961-1966) which aimed to encourage 
industrialization and economic growth in the private sector. This Plan was then 
followed by the Second National Economic Development Plan (1967-1971). ―The 
First and Second National Economic Plans set out a clear import-substitution 
strategy, based on the private sector‖ (Linnemann, Dijeck & Verbruggen 1987: 
297). It was argued by Daquilla (2005) that, in order to reduce its reliance on 
imported consumer goods, the ISI was used as the main objective of Thailand‘s 
policy makers during the period from 1960-1971. In implementing the ISI regime, 
the Thai government formulated various policies which were implemented by 
various agencies including the imposition of higher tariffs on imported goods 
(Ministry of Finance), the imposition of quota restrictions (Ministry of 
Commerce) as well as the introduction of investment incentives (BOI) such as an 
exemption from import duties on capital goods, raw materials and intermediate 
inputs and also an exemption from corporate tax (Daquilla, 2005: 77-78). These 
investment incentives were provided to both foreign and domestic investors in 
selected key sectors.  
 
52 
 
Although the ISI policy was successful in setting Thailand on the path of 
industrialization, its ability to constrain for durable development became less 
certain by the 1970s due to several reasons such as deteriorating profitability, the 
exhaustion of domestic demand, excess capacities, saturated market, etc. The ISI 
also ―encountered problems due to the small-scale domestic market and a growing 
trade deficit owing to increased imports of capital and intermediate goods‖ 
(Higashi, 1996: 1). In addition, ISI in Thailand left many problems to be resolved 
and it was widely known that this ―ISI was not targeted accordingly to systematic 
economic criteria, but was pursued in a chaotic, inefficient manner and for too 
long by the BOI‖ (Siripachai, 1994a: 5). Furthermore, protectionism granted to 
the domestic industry under ISI regime was not well accepted by technocrats 
which favor for EOI.  
 
Due to several weaknesses of the ISI, the World Bank mission to Thailand,  
in 1970 recommended to the Thai government ―to move towards a less protected 
and more competitive industrial structure by among other, made a vigorous 
promotion of export oriented manufacturing‖ (Siripachai, 1994b: 14). Thus, 
starting from 1972, the Thai government started to move from ISI to EOI by 
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adopting the Third National Development Plan (1972-1977) which emphasized a 
change in its industrial policy towards the promotion of manufactured exports, the 
deepening of the import-substitution process for intermediate goods and raw 
materials, the promotion of small-scale and labor-intensive industries, and the 
dispersion of industries into rural areas (Daquilla, 2005: 77-78). During this time 
after 1970s, Linnemann, Dijeck & Verbruggen (1987: 298) viewed that ―Thailand 
pursued a dualistic industrialization and trade strategy‖. Import-substitution 
industries were further encouraged through increased tariff protection resulting 
from the tariff revision in 1970 and 1974. At the same time, manufactured exports 
were promoted through additional incentives under the Investment Promotion Act 
which was revised in 1972. Industries which were included in the list of 
‗promoted export-oriented industries‘ under the BOI enjoyed various privileges 
such as full exemption from import duties and business taxes on intermediate 
goods and machinery, exemption from export duties, tax advantages, and a 
rediscount facility at subsidized interest rates. ―Those not promoted by the BOI 
were also entitled for a refund of import duties and all other taxes incurred in the 
production of exportable goods‖.10 The emphasis on the EOI was propounded in 
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the subsequent Thai‘s National Economic Development Plans with the 
import-substitution policy remained intact.   
 
The implementation of EOI was further deepened after the economic 
downturn and external oil shocks in 1980s, indicating problems in policy for 
manufacturing sectors. During this time, the importance of trade liberalization, 
transfer of technology by FDI, and the role of exports in spurring economic 
growth were recognized as important components in the country‘s development. 
Therefore, in gaining the advantage, Thailand started to give full commitment to 
the EOI policies in pursuit of economic reform by mid-1980s. This effort 
contributed to the robust economic growth (1985-1997) and deeper integration of 
the Thai economy in the international economy.  
 
3.2.1 Policy on the Automotive Industry 
The automotive industry was regarded as one of Thailand‘s key sectors for 
economic development under the ISI strategy. The industry is viewed by many 
developing countries as a major engine of economic growth in achieving their aim of 
industrialization, often due to business/economic linkages created by this particular 
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industry. ―The automobile industry became a major target for industrialization as it has 
a wide range of related sectors with immense effects on job creation and the 
development of sophisticated industrial structures‖ (Yoshimatsu, 2002: 121).  
 
The Thai automotive industry started to commence its operation in 1960s 
with limited production of auto parts by private-led companies with strong 
protection by the state. The industry developed with an objective of substituting 
imports of completed built-up units (CBUs). To accelerate the substitution of 
imports and to create employment, the Thai government promoted the 
establishment plants to assemble automobiles and manufacture auto 
components/parts by granting various tax incentives. By 1969, there were six 
assemblers in the industry; (1) Siam Motor & Nissan, (2) Toyota Motor Thailand, 
(3) MMC Sittapol (Mitsubishi), (4) Isuzu Motor Thailand, (5) Thailand Hino 
Industry, and (6) Thonburi Automotive Assembly (Benz) (Abdulsomad, 1999: 
275). In 1971, as the automobile industry generated negative trade balance which 
was in sharp contrast to the intentions of government promotional policy, the 
government announced a new rationalization plan for the development of the Thai 
automobile industry. In conjunction with this plan, ―the Automotive Development 
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Committee (ADC) was set up by the MOI, and the BOI stopped granting 
promotional privileges to new assembly plants‖ (Abdulsomad, 1999: 281). 
 
Under the ISI regime, the Thai government adopted various protection 
measures in alleviating competition to ensure the survival and development of the 
domestic automotive industry. ―In early 1975, local content requirements were 
introduced at 25 per cent for passenger cars, 20 per cent for commercial vehicles 
with windshields and 15 per cent for commercial vehicles without windshields‖ 
(Abdulsomad, 1999: 275). ―In 1978, the Thai government banned imports of CBU 
passenger cars and raised import duties on CKD kits to 80 per cent. The 
government also required assemblers to increase the ratio of local content for 
passenger cars from 25 per cent to 50 per cent within 5 years‖ (Doner, 1991 as 
cited in Yoshimatsu, 2002). ―In 1978, the government also introduced the 
―mandatory deletion‖ of specific parts from imported CKD kits such as brake 
drums and exhaust system, which had been locally produced for some time‖ 
(Abdulsomad, 1999: 275).  
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As a result of the protective import policies (such as import ban on CBU 
vehicles), domestic demand for local passenger cars increased drastically in the 
1980s. However, this demand was not satisfied by the availability of supply by 
local producers due to their limited capacity. The unavailable stock together with 
the restriction imposed on imported cars, created consumer‘s tension and 
dissatisfaction which led to the automotive policy reform by the government. ―In 
1991, with the establishment of the Anand Panyarachun government, Thailand 
started to introduce liberalization policy which transformed the automotive sector 
into an internationally competitive industry‖ (Abdulsomad, 1999: 82). In this year, 
the Ministry of Commerce announced an abolishment of passenger-car-import 
restriction where the ban on imports of CBU was lifted in April 1991. ―The 
Cabinet also launched a new structure for passenger-car tariffs, including a 
commercial tax to reduce tax burden for imported and domestically assembled 
cars where import tariffs on CBU and CKD were substantially reduced in July 
1991. Further, the government approved the establishment of new assembly plants 
for passenger cars in 1994‖ (Higashi, 1996: 7). Consequently, after these 
relaxations, the car price decreased and domestic consumers were largely 
benefited as they could enjoy cheaper cars. 
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After almost 30 years adopting industrial development strategy based on 
ISI which more dependable on protection policy, the Thai government made a 
significant reform by intensifying it‘s liberalize policy beginning from year 2000. 
According to Ministry of Industry‘s Report, ―effective on 1st January 2000, 
local-content requirement policies that had been applied on automotive 
assembling since 1972 was abolished and new automotive companies enjoyed free 
entry into the automotive industry‖ with no limitation on number of firms allowed 
(MOI, 2002: 10). Effective on the same date ―a revised-automotive-tariff was 
enforced to complement with the policy‘s elimination of local content 
requirements‖.11  
 
The industrial policies implemented by the Thai government on the 
automotive sector, especially at the earlier stage of its development had 
undoubtedly fostered the industry. These policies helped Thailand to achieve its 
goal of the ISI in substituting imports by developing its local assemblers and auto 
parts manufacturers. These government policies also succeed in creating 
conducive business environment which encouraged investment from private (local 
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and foreign investments). With the private-led development model, the Thai auto 
industry was developed in a speediest manner as compared to other Southeast 
Asian countries. In addition, the gradual liberalization of the auto policies based 
on market situation/condition further benefited both, the consumers and the 
producers. 
 
3.2.2 Policy on the Steel Industry 
The steel industry is regarded as an important industry in most of 
developing countries which became vital for economic growth of their national 
economy. Although Thailand adopted ISI in 1960s, the steel industry was not 
properly developed compared to its neighboring countries. There was no 
state-owned firm that involved in this industry. As Thailand‘s development 
strategy is based on the private-led economic development model, the 
development of the industry was left in the hand of private firms which operated 
with low capital investment mainly concentrated in downstream activities. 
According to Higashi (1996: 12), ―until the 1970s, the development of the 
industry was limited to downstream processes such as pipe manufacturing, steel 
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bar production and, wire rod manufacturing‖. Moreover, Nakagawa (2007: 160) 
argues that, although Thailand‘s steel industry began to develop along with the ISI 
strategies set out in the 1960s, any effective policies were not carried out by the 
Thai government until mid 1980s.  
 
However, the Thai government started to give attention to the steel sector after 
the increase of domestic demand became apparent, especially from the construction 
sector resulting from massive foreign investment after the Plaza Accord in 1985 
(Nakagawa, 2007: 160). ―In 1988, due to the high linkage between the steel industry 
and many other industries, the BOI began to promote investment of an integrated steel 
project in response to the future increasing demand for flat steel products‖ (Higashi, 
1996: 12). At this time, ―the MOI adopted protection measures through restriction on 
number of steel producers‖.12 As the integrated steel project required capital intensive, 
the ministry had ―limited this steel project to only one producer at first, in order to 
support the huge investment on such project‖.13 In relation to this, the BOI granted the 
right to Sahaviriya Group to launch Thailand‘s first integrated steel project in 1989.  
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 ibid. 
13 ibid. No similar project would be allowed for the next 10 years to protect huge and massive 
investment of selected firm of the integrated steel mills. 
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In the early 1990s, the steel industry grew steadily in parallel with the 
increasing demand from utilized industries such as the automotive and electrical 
appliance industries and the rapid economic growth of Thailand. Therefore, ―in 
the Seventh National Economic Plan (1992-1996), the iron and steel industry was 
recognized as one of the six targeted industries to be selected for priority 
development where under this plan, the upstream iron industry was promoted by 
the government‖ (Higashi, 1996: 14). To meet the increased demand, the 
government lifted the previous restriction on number of producers allowed to 
produce flat rolled steel.
14
 With this liberalization, the industry then was no 
longer monopolized by only one producer. ―In case of cold rolled steel projects, 
the government would permit cold-rolled production from January 1998 as long 
as producers sell their products to the local market‖ (Low, 1995 cited in Higashi, 
1996: 14). To further promote the iron and steel industry, ―new projects were 
permitted an 8-year corporate income tax exemption regardless of location‖ 
(Kwan Tse, 1996: 1). 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
14
 Previously, only Sahaviriya Group was allowed to produce flat rolled steel for 10 years period. 
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However, the increased trend in domestic consumption did not last long as 
in mid 1990s, Thailand‘s domestic demand dropped sharply due to the decline in 
the construction boom which reached its peak in 1995, and the destructive impact 
of 1997 currency collapse (Nakagawa 2007: 160). This situation further created 
overcapacity of steel production in the local market. During this time, an excess 
capacity of steel production also occurred worldwide. To protect domestic steel 
makers, the BOI, in August 1996, ―imposed additional surcharges on imports of 
structural sections, low carbon wire rod, and stainless cold-rolled products which 
were set at 16 per cent, 10 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively‖ (Kwan Tse, 1996: 
2). To further protect the domestic steel industry, ―the Industrial Standard Institute 
of Thailand (ISIT), under the MOI, announced three compulsory standards that 
pertained to hot-rolled coil, plate, and sheet and began implementing the new 
rules in August 2001 to stop imports of substandard hot-rolled products‖ (Wu, 
2001: 26.3).  
 
As worldwide excess capacity of steel heightened in 2002, Thailand also 
imposed restrictive measures in the form of non-tariff barriers to safeguard the 
domestic industry from available cheap imports. ―In May 2003, the Thai 
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Government, through the Ministry of Commerce, decided to impose antidumping 
duties that ranged from 5.98 per cent to 136.5 per cent on hot-rolled steel 
imported from Japan and 13 other countries, which included Algeria, Argentina, 
India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, 
South Africa, Taiwan, Ukraine, and Venezuela. A 36.25 per cent tariff was 
imposed on imports from Japan‖ (Wu, 2003: 26.3). ―In December 2003, Thailand 
started to gradually liberalize its steel industry. The government announced that 
import taxes would be gradually reduced to 5 per cent on certain steel items‖.15 
The import tax reduction was carried as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Reduction of Import Duty on Steel Products 
Steel Products Previous Import 
Duty 
New Import Duty 
hot-rolled 
steel products 
10%  Reduced to 7.5%  
(from  16 Dec 2003-31 Dec 2004) 
 Reduced to 5% (beginning Jan 2005) 
cold-rolled steel 
sheet in coils and 
cold drawn bar 
12%  Reduced to 9.5%  
(from  16 Dec 2003-31 Dec 2004) 
 Reduced to 7% for year 2005 
 Reduced to 6% for year 2006 
 Reduced to 5% beginning Jan 2007 
Source: Southeast Asia Iron and Steel Institute, 2004. 
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 ibid. As cited by Wu, 2003 in Southeast Asia Iron and Steel Institute, 2004b, Thailand reduced 
import taxes on certain products, SEAISI Newsletter, accessed August 3, 2004, at URL 
 http://www.seaisi.org/news_detail.asp?id=1490&y=2004&m=1. 
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 The protective industrial policies successfully developed the Thai steel 
industry even though concentration to this sector was given later than the auto 
sector. The Thai government had wisely and promptly formulated industrial 
policies based on market‘s demand and supply of the steel products. The 
government‘s protection (through protective industrial policies) and gradual 
reduction of this protection helped the industry to develop steadily as their 
survival was guaranteed by the government. 
 
3.2.3 Nature of Thailand’s Past Industrial Policy 
As mentioned in the previous section, industrialization brought Thailand 
into one of prosperous developing countries in Asia. Despite this remarkable 
success, Thailand also faced a bumpy road along its industrialization process. In 
its earlier attempt for industrialization, the Thai government widely involved in 
the process by setting-up various state enterprises producing industrial products. 
However, this initiative failed as the operation of most of these public enterprises 
was inefficient due to poor management and widespread corruption (Ingram, 1971 
cited in Yang, 1994: 192). Furthermore, involvement of state also discouraged 
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private enterprises to invest as they refused to compete with state-owned 
enterprises.  
 
This situation forced the government to revisit the industrialization 
strategy. According to Yang (1994: 192), in late 1950, the government sharply 
reversed its industrialization policy by reducing its direct involvement in the 
manufacturing sector and switched instead to play a supporting role to private 
enterprises through the granting of investment incentives and the provision of 
public infrastructure, and limiting public control of the private sector. This 
strategy further allowed private sectors to expand (Hewison, 2002: 232). The 
private-led strategy with less government‘s intervention and vast involvement of 
private sector provided for a conducive environment for business to grow. This 
created strong business groups which dominated the Thai industry. The strong 
foundation of the private sector undoubtedly contributed to the development of 
the Thai economy until today. This private-led model adopted by the Thai 
government along its industrialization process has evidently placed Thailand as 
one of the rapid developing countries in Asia. This strong private sector‘s 
background together with past industrial policies which favored private sectors 
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further provided an interesting ground to observe more on their response towards 
JTEPA which request local industries to sacrifice for market liberalization.    
 
3.3 Overview of Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement 
(JTEPA) 
3.3.1 Overview of JTEPA 
The possibility of having bilateral FTA between Japan-Thailand was early 
proposed by Prime Minister Thaksin to Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro 
Koizumi during his official visit to Japan in November 2001. Further to this, 
―during their bilateral meeting at the margin of Boao Forum for Asia in Hainan 
Island, China, on 12 April 2002, the two Prime Ministers decided to begin 
consultations for an agreement of Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership (JTEP) in 
a Working Group, which was subsequently set up under the Japan-Thailand 
Economic Partnership Consultations meeting held on 12 July 2002‖ (MOFA, 
2003a: 2). Subsequent to this, ―two preparatory meetings were held in May 2002 
in Bangkok and in July in Tokyo between representatives of the two governments, 
who decided to use the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement 
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(JSEPA) as a reference to pursue the JTEP‖.16 A Working Group (WG) was 
formed to explore the JTEP and to create informal texts for reference in the coming 
negotiations on JTEP. Based on the outcome of the WG, the Task Force then 
addressed various issue of JTEP in three meetings held from July to November 2003.  
 
The formal negotiation for JTEPA began in February 2004. These 
negotiations took 10 Rounds to be completed and involved various contentious 
issues along its process. Despite all the difficulties faced by the Thai government, 
the JTEPA was successfully signed by government leaders in Tokyo on April 3, 
2007. The joint statement by the two leaders, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and 
Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont appropriately declared that JTEPA was 
concluded with the aim to ―take onto a higher plane our partnership for the mutual 
benefit of our peoples and lay a solid foundation for an East Asian community‖ 
(MOFA, 2007). This statement is in line with Thailand‘s main objective for 
JTEPA which among others are; (1) the JTEPA must help to promote more 
investment between the two countries; (2) JTEPA to ensure the free flow of 
people and (3) JTEPA is to enhance further cooperation in all possible areas.  
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3.3.2 Outcome of JTEPA  
  The JTEPA came into force on November 1, 2007. ―The agreement 
covers various areas such as trade in goods, rules of origin, trade in services, 
investment, movement of natural persons, cooperation in 9 areas and 7 joint 
projects‖.17 Under trade in goods, ―tariffs on 99.51 per cent of goods imported 
from Japan in 2006, amounting to 99.49 per cent of the total value of imported 
Japanese goods, have been reduced or eliminated, or received a special quota 
quantity from Japan. At the same time, tariffs on 92.95 per cent of Thai exports to 
Japan were reduced or eliminated or granted special quotas, comprising 98.06 per 
cent of all tariff lines for Thai exports to Japan in 2006‖. 18  Thailand has 
committed to allow Japan and the Japanese citizens to hold up to 50 per cent 
equity in automotive production firms (with Thais holding the remaining equity), 
and the company established is not required to seek permission to operate the 
business.  
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 Information on ―Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA)‖ from Department 
of Trade Negotiation (DTN), Thailand. http://www.thaifta.com/english/index_eng.html 
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The JTEPA also identified seven initial project areas for cooperation 
between the Thai Minister of Commerce and the Japanese Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry namely; (1) ―Kitchen of the World" Project; (2) 
Japan-Thailand "Steel Industry Cooperation Programme‖; (3) "Automotive 
Human Resources Development Institute" Project; (4) ―Energy Conservation 
Project‖; (5) ―Value-creation Economy‖ Project; (6) ―Public - private Partnership‖ 
and (7) Cooperative Project in the Textile and Garment Industry.
19
  
 
In terms of industrial products specifically for the automotive industry, 
―tariffs on most imports of Japanese vehicle parts would be eliminated by 2011. 
For sensitive items, tariff would be eliminated by 2013. Tariffs on automobile 
imports of passenger cars with engines larger than 3,000 cc would drop from their 
current level of 80 per cent to 60 per cent by 2009‖ (BOI, 2006: 1). For the steel 
industry, ―tariffs on hot-rolled steel not produced in Thailand would be eliminated 
immediately once JTEPA enters into force‖.20 Details of the outcome of the 
agreement for the steel, auto and auto parts sectors are shown in Table 4.  
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Table 4: Outcome of JTEPA on Industrial Goods 
Products Tariff Before JTEPA Tariff After JTEPA 
Steel and steel goods 1% - 20%  Tariff on hot-rolled steel that 
no produce locally will be 
eliminate immediately. 
 Quota: steel for using in 
auto industry received 
280,000 ton in 1
st
 year 
without tariff. Quota then 
will be calculated every year 
by advising from 
Japan-Thailand steel 
dialogue. Tariff will be 
completely removed in year 
11. 
 Out of quota steel for auto 
industry – tariff will be kept 
for 10 years. 
 Other hot-rolled steel – tariff 
will be kept for 10 years and 
remove in next year. 
Auto parts for OEM 15% - 30%  If tariff > 20% - reduce to 
20%, keep for 5 years then 
remove in next year. 
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Products Tariff Before JTEPA Tariff After JTEPA 
   If tariff < 20% - tariff will 
be kept for 5 years and then 
remove in next year. 
 For auto parts and engine – 
tariff will be kept for 7 years 
then remove in next year. 
Automobile engines 
> 3,000cc 
80%  Tariff will be reduced 5% 
each year until become 60% 
in 4 years then tariff will be 
re-negotiated. 
Automobile engines 
< 3,000cc 
80%  Renegotiate in year 6th. 
Source: MOFA, Thailand. Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement, 2
nd
 Publication 2006 
as cited in Bhangsbha (2008). 
 
3.3.3 Negotiation Process of JTEPA 
The negotiation of JTEPA faced several difficulties. It took almost three 
years to be negotiated before it can be concluded in November 2007. Although 
Thailand formally began its negotiation at the same time (February 2004) with its 
neighbor country, Malaysia who also negotiated for an EPA with Japan, Thailand 
was late in concluding the deal. This was due to difficulties faced by the Thai 
government along the negotiation process. In negotiating on the JTEPA, the 
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government already set its main interest. As one of major exporters of agricultural 
products, Thailand tried to find new market and secured the existing market for its 
agriculture exports. Therefore, Thailand negotiated the JTEPA with the aim to 
open-up Japan highly protected agricultural sectors such as rice, sugar and 
chicken, which were considered as sensitive sectors for Japan. In contrast, Japan 
had interested in getting market access to industrial sectors, especially the 
automotive and steel sectors which were regarded as Thai‘s key industries.  
 
The first phase of the negotiation is stalled due to Thai‘s request for Japan 
to scrap import tariffs on rice, chicken, sugar and starch. Prime Minister Koizumi 
rejected the request to scrap rice tariffs. Koizumi contended that, "what is 
impossible is impossible, even if a lot of time is spent on it".
21
 The resistance 
from the Japanese government could be predicted earlier as Japan was 
consistently protected its agricultural sector in various fora including in its 
bilateral FTA policy and multilateral trade negotiation under the WTO. To 
overcome the impasse and to accelerate the JTEPA, Thaksin decided to withdraw 
rice from the negotiation table and proceed with other commodities of agriculture 
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and industrial products. The second phase of negotiation only took place after the 
working group of trade liberalization on goods resumed talks on Nov. 8-10, 2004 
in Bangkok.  
 
In the second phase of the JTEPA‘s negotiation, Thailand faced a new wave of 
difficulties in negotiating on its industrial goods as there was intense opposition exerted 
along the negotiation process. The obstacles in the negotiation process were then 
followed by dozen of critiques and actions taken by the NGOs, politicians and 
academicians towards the transparency of the negotiated agreement, credibility of 
current government and possible consequences of the agreement. However, since 
Thailand adopted a single undertaking concept
22
 in negotiating for the agreement, it 
managed to conclude for an agreement which could be regarded as having ―win-win 
situation‖ elements at the end of the negotiation process of JTEPA.   
 
3.4 Domestic Politics of JTEPA 
The Japanese quest for trade liberalization of Thai‘s automotive and steel 
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sectors raised concern among various groups. In Thailand, ―the interface between 
international and domestic forces came into full play and turns the FTA policy 
into a highly controversial issue garnering widespread interests and provoking 
intense political debates‖ (Peamsilpakulchorn, 2006: 65). For FTA‘s opponents, 
trade liberalization sought by Japan would give negative impacts on the domestic 
market. Many of them wished for Thailand‘s negotiators to wisely negotiate for 
the JTEPA in order to safeguard their interests. While for FTA‘s supporters, FTA 
with Japan would create an opportunity in gaining market access to Japan. 
Between these groups, stood state actors/government officials who were involved 
in trade policy formulation and who were tasked and given mandate to negotiate 
for a high-quality FTA with Japan. 
 
According to Peamsilpakulchorn (2006: 66), ―the enthusiasms and 
intensities of the politics surrounding FTA policy provide an interesting 
framework to question the dynamic and conflicting forces in Thailand‘s current 
trade policy‖. Furthermore, ―in a democratic society, how a government responds 
to international imperatives through properly engineered foreign economic policy, 
which could satisfy the majority of its constituency, could have definitive effects 
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on government viability‖ (Peamsilpakulchorn, 2006: 66). In addition to this, the 
interest of all stakeholders has also to be considered in achieving a meaningful 
FTA policy. Therefore, it is interesting to study domestic politics that rest behind 
the JTEPA in order to observe the stakeholders‘ interests, particularly economic 
interests, both from private and state/government perspectives. This observation is 
in need as in this study I will try to examine how past policy trends to foster 
specific industrial sectors influence the negotiation process over an FTA. By 
evaluating the societal actors and government official‘s responses towards JTEPA, 
it could give insights into how domestic societal actors in relation to domestic 
industrial policy interact with international forces brought by FTAs and how 
government officials could pursue FTAs with those societal actor‘s pressures 
(support/oppose) and with their own preferences held, as ―concerns for negative 
consequences of deeper economic liberalization and unfair global economic 
governance would have political repercussions not only on the global scene but 
also on the domestic front‖.23 For societal actors‘ (in particular business groups‘) 
responses, Ricardo-Viner model laid a basic foundation in associating their 
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respond towards liberalization pursued by FTAs.
24
 According to the model, ―the 
political cleavage would be aligned along the boundary between the 
export-oriented or competitive sector (free traders) and import-oriented or 
uncompetitive sectors (protectionists)‖ (Peamsilpakulchorn, 2006: 68). Here we 
can say that export-oriented sectors will support JTEPA while import-competing 
sectors will make the fullest efforts to oppose it.   
 
In assessing domestic politics surrounding the JTEPA, this paper will 
further examine responses and preferences of the societal actors‘ and government 
officials towards JTEPA (in relation with past industrial policy) by focusing on 
the negotiation process of the JTEPA. To have better understanding on 
relationship between responses and preferences based on past industrial policy 
with the negotiation process, this paper will examine how the societal actors‘ 
response and government official‘s preferences influence the negotiation process 
of JTEPA. Will the responses and preferences make the negotiation process 
smooth or unsmooth. In order to fulfill this objective, I will divide this section into 
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 The Ricardo-Viner model argues that, in reality, factors are not mobile  and once they are 
employed in a certain industry, they are specific to that industry, so that when an industry is 
decline, they cannot , in the short run, move to a more profitable industry (factor immobility). 
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two parts. In the first part, I will focus on government officials‘ influence on the 
negotiation process of JTEPA, and the second part will focus on societal actors‘ 
influence. 
 
3.4.1 Government Officials’ Preference in the Negotiation Process 
In understanding politics behind JTEPA, it is important to examine the 
involvement and influence of government officials especially policy makers and 
negotiators towards the negotiation process of JTEPA. Although officials are 
mandated to negotiate for a meaningful and benefited deal with Japan, they also 
need to consider various issues along the negotiation process before achieving the 
goal. Negotiators play an important role to bring the negotiations to a successful 
conclusion. However, Thailand‘s negotiators which were led by Chief Negotiator, 
Mr. Pisan Manawapat, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
were guided by high ranking officials namely Prime Minister and Ministers, in 
negotiating for the FTA agreement. Therefore, they do not have authority or final 
say for all issues negotiated with the Japanese side. This was shown by the 
statement made by Mr. Pisan for the press release of the Chief-Delegate and 
Working-Level Retreat on the JTEPA on 25 and 28 October 2004. Mr. Pisan 
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reaffirmed that ―the Thai side would adhere to the leaders‘ guidance thereby 
withdrawing rice from its request list, and expressed hope that the Japanese side 
do likewise‖.25 Moreover, in JTEPA‘s case, it is interesting to note the policy 
preferences of Thailand‘s Prime Minister, Thaksin who held the final say for any 
decision made along the negotiations process. Upon his appointment as Thai 
Prime Minister, Thaksin, a successful businessman turned to be a politician, 
declared to govern Thailand using CEO-style which was similar in running a 
company with a preference for a quick result-oriented. Thaksin and his party, Thai 
Rak Thai (TRT), also fostered a ―dual-track development strategy that aimed to 
strengthen domestic activities at the grass-roots level as well as promote linkages 
between the domestic economy and the world economy‖ (Hewison, 2004: 511). 
His business background together with his policy preference charted his decision 
on JTEPA.  
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 JTEP Office, MOFA, Thailand. ―Unofficial translation of Press Release JTEPA‖, October 
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      Although Thailand applied the top-down system in decision making with 
authority that was in the hand of Prime Minister and his deputy, negotiators which 
represented by various ministries also played a significant role during the 
negotiation process of JTEPA. In the negotiation arena, in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of the negotiators‘ role, it was very crucial for negotiators to have a 
clear mandate from all stakeholders to make certain that a meaningful and 
benefited agreement could be reached after negotiations were concluded. In Thai 
case, it could be seen that there was no concrete mandate given to the negotiators 
in negotiating for their national interest, instead some observers believed that 
Thailand was rushing in negotiating and concluding FTAs with its partners. 
―FTAs were rushed, driven by fuzzy foreign-policy goals, and had very little sense 
of an economic strategy. Careful preparation was conspicuously lacking. There was 
little thinking about the links between FTAs and the national economic 
framework in terms of domestic policies, supporting institutions and priorities for 
reform. Rather FTAs were tacked on with little aforethought‖ (Sally, 2005: 4). 
 
In the JTEPA‘s negotiation, it was obvious that two different directions 
were given to Thai negotiators along the negotiation process. In the early stage, 
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there was an intention for them to protect their key industrial sectors (automobile 
and steel industry). However towards the end of the negotiation, they were given 
diverse directions to open-up the Thai market for Japanese imports. This was due 
to different approaches taken by officials in continuously fostering the automotive 
and steel industries. Some officers preferred government to continue granting 
protection to the industries and for them this protection would shield the local 
industries from stiff competition with imported goods and would further help 
them to faster the growth of those industries. Whereas for other officials 
especially the high ranking officers/politicians, they foresee that the growth of the 
industries could only be realized by removing protection and allow for a fair 
competition with imported goods. For them, stiff competition from imports would 
force the industries to be competitive and change their strategy by making efforts 
to expand their market internationally.        
 
Officials from Ministry of Industry (MOI) preferred to protect the 
domestic industry to ensure its survival from competition brought by imported 
industrial goods. Before negotiating on JTEPA, during the Task Force meeting, 
Thailand stressed that few industries are considered sensitive for liberalization. 
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The said industries were iron and steel items, automotive and automotive parts 
and petrochemical products. According to officer from Department of Trade 
Negotiations (DTN), Thailand, ―the steel industry was protected by many groups 
especially MOI and Iron and Steel Institute of Thailand (ISIT)" (Bhangsbha, 
2008: 50). One of government senior official also ―urged local steel manufacturers, 
users and foreign carmakers to hold out against the Japanese government‘s 
demand that Thailand open its steel and auto industries to competition‖.26 The 
―newly appointed Commerce Minister Thanong Bidaya also expressed that he 
would pursue bilateral free trade negotiations, especially with Japan, but only if 
Thailand is treated fairly‖.27 This statement showed how an attempt to protect the 
local industries was made by officials‘ based on their preferences to continuously 
foster the domestic industry in Thailand by continuously protecting the industries. 
To further ensure that no injuries would be faced by the steel industry, Deputy 
Prime Minister, Somkid Jatusripitak asked for the establishment of a ―bilateral 
commission to study steel-related issues and to examine steel quality standards 
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 The Nation, ―Opposition to steel and auto sectors in FTA‖. March 22, 2005. 
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 Bangkok Post, ―Thanong vows fair treatment in trade talks‖. March 17, 2005. 
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and product requirements of the domestic auto industry‖.28 Should ―Thai mills 
are unable to produce steel as required by carmakers, then the product can only be 
included in negotiations under the JTEPA‖.29 However, due to limited sources, 
all of these attempts and statements were unable to show us on how and to what 
extent do these officers try to protect domestic industries from trade liberalization 
sought under JTEPA.  
 
Despite endeavor to continuously protect sensitive industries during the 
negotiation process, the divergence of stance also existed among government 
officials of Thailand. With an aim to transform Thailand to become the ‗Detroit of 
Asia‘, Thailand‘s Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra had his own agenda to 
make structural adjustment at home through liberalization under JTEPA. For him, 
the growth of the domestic industry internationally could only be quickly 
achieved with stiff competition brought by liberalization mechanisms. During his 
speech at the United Nations on 18 February 2003 on the benefits of FTA to 
Thailand, he stated that the government had to make Thailand‘s private sectors 
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stronger and ready to move internationally. In doing so the government need not 
wait for the private sectors, instead private sectors had to follow the government 
by accepting liberalization under FTA as FTA bring many chances by opening 
market for Thai manufacturers and consumers (Bhangsbha, 2008). Along the 
negotiation process of JTEPA, Thaksin also did condemn Thai‘s private sector for 
seeking protection from government and he insisted Thai‘s auto sector to 
understand the essential of liberalization in the Thai market.
30
  
 
The investment plan proposed by Japan‘s automobile players was seen to 
indirectly influence Thai officials‘ stance. After it was reported that Toyota was 
planning to invest $467 million to establish a third auto plant in Thailand, Mr. 
Thanong, Thai‘s Commerce Minister, welcomed the idea by stating that ―the 
move would benefit the local auto parts sector and would further the country's 
goal to become a regional auto production hub‖. 31  Impressed by the idea, 
Thanong then came out with a controversial stance where during the press 
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statement he stated that ―hot-rolled steel could be excluded from Thailand's 
sensitive list in negotiations for the proposed JTEPA‖.32 The move, which would 
give advantage to local carmakers (which largely depends on hot-rolled steel in 
their production) at the expense of Thai steel producers, was seen as a 
compromise to Japan. However for Thanong, the opening-up of Thai‘s steel 
market would boost the production base of the automobile industry. He also 
believed that importing steel would also encourage car manufacturers to expand 
operations in Thailand to take advantage of lower costs. In addition to the 
investment plan, Thanong‘s stance was also influenced by efforts made by the 
Japanese negotiators and business groups. ―Japanese negotiators have taken the 
unusual step of bypassing Thai trade officials and making their pitches directly to 
Commerce Minister Thanong‖.33 The leaders of Japan Keidanren then followed 
the step by meeting with Thanong to further lobby or express the need for 
Thailand to liberalize its automotive and steel markets. 
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 Bangkok Post, ―Thailand could ease steel barriers, Move to spur Japan-Thai free trade talks. 31 
March 2005. 
33
 Bangkok Post, ―Support for auto hub linked to ease tariffs‖. 11 April 2005. 
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Statement made by Thanong directly influenced the negotiation process of 
the JTEPA. This statement undermined the negotiating position of Thai‘s 
negotiating team. The negotiators especially from MOI who tried to protect the 
steel industry and the team who wished to utilize steel as a ‗key bargaining chip‘ 
in their strategy to force Japan to open-up its domestic agricultural market was 
now puzzled by a contrast indication given by Thanong. Previously in 2004, in 
order to protect the steel industry, Ministry of Commerce ―imposed anti-dumping 
duties on imported hot-rolled steel from a number of countries including Japan‖.34 
Even though the protection measures still took place and Japan was closed to 
agree for Thailand to continue its protection on key industrial goods including 
hot-rolled steel in exchange for Japan to maintain protection on agricultural goods, 
now, the negotiating team was directed to open-up the steel market for imports 
from Japan.  
 
Thanong‘s policy shift made the negotiators‘ ability to further bargain for 
a meaningful deal was dwindled and Japanese negotiators now are more 
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advantageous in the ‗negotiating game‘. The Japanese negotiators scraped the 
final day of talks for the 7
th
 Round and searched for a direct meeting with Mr. 
Somkid, the Finance Minister and Head of Committee on FTA Strategy and 
Negotiations, to request for more industrial concessions on liberalization and to 
discuss Tokyo's trade stance directly bypassing the Thai negotiating team.  
 
Notwithstanding the contradictory signal which created chaos for the 
Thais along the negotiation process, lobbying efforts made by Japanese business 
groups and officials also worsened the situation. It was reported that the Heads of 
Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA), Japan Auto Parts 
Industries Association (JAPIA) and senior officials of the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI) met Thaksin ―to pledge full support and gave 
assurance for Thailand's ambitions to become the ‗Detroit of Asia‘ with the 
condition that Thailand would be ready to liberalize steel and car tariffs under the 
JTEPA‖.35 Further, these groups also warned that Japanese carmakers (members 
of JAMA and JAPIA) ―might pull out of Bt41 billion worth of planned 
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investments if Thailand fails to cut tariffs on steel and vehicles under the 
agreement‖. 36  It is reported that JAMA-member assemblers and JAPIA 
parts-suppliers provided about 122,000 jobs in Thailand during the negotiations 
took place. This lobbying strategy adopted by Japanese side indirectly influenced 
Thaksin in making decision and providing direction for the negotiating team. 
 
The JTEPA‘s case showed that government officials‘ preferences have a 
significant influence on the negotiation process. Preferences to continuously foster 
specific industrial sectors however were differently interpreted in terms of its 
approach. This further led to a divergence stance made by the officials‘ along the 
negotiation process of the JTEPA which made the process unsmooth and chaotic. 
The JTEPA exemplified how cohesion among government officials‘ and 
coordination between authorities were needed in policy making process in order 
to avoid confusion and problem along the negotiation process. Furthermore, it is 
imperative for the government officials to have a solid mandate as they are the 
ones who are responsible to keep for the national interests.     
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3.4.2 Societal Actor’s Influence on the Negotiation Process  
In order to conceptualize linkages between trade liberalization brought by 
JTEPA and political responses from social groups, it is important to reiterate here 
that since Japan‘s main aim was to acquire market access to the Thai industrial 
sector, particularly the auto and steel sectors, most political responses would come 
from economic/business actors who would be directly affected by trade 
liberalization of the auto and steel industries. Therefore, in examining this 
response, this study will only concentrate on influences made by economic actors 
or business groups towards FTAs negotiation and will not look for other 
influences brought by other groups such as the NGOs like FTA Watch, 
academicians, and the public in general.  
 
―Although businesses tend to be supportive of the government‘s overall 
attempt to liberalize the economy, they also strongly opposed the FTA if it 
directly threatens their interests‖ (Peamsilpakulchorn, 2006: 83). ―Strong business 
resistance from import-competing sectors was evident with the JTEPA where 
political alignment opposing the deal was found among local steel producers, 
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local auto parts producers, and non-Japanese carmakers‖.37 These business actors 
which represented domestic industrial players used various channels to express 
their concerns on the agreement. In the beginning of the JTEPA‘s negotiation, 
there were no resistance efforts made by these business groups as negotiation was 
focused on ‗normal track‘ and agricultural goods. The opposition efforts from 
local auto parts producers started to instigate from 5
th
 Round of negotiation, when 
negotiators negotiate for ‗sensitive track‘, in particular, the market opening of 
auto and auto parts industries. These efforts were also supported by non-Japanese 
carmakers. The opposition efforts were then followed by local steel producers. All 
of them pressured government to exclude automobile and steel industries from the 
negotiation table.  
 
―Domestic steel producers protested that opening the domestic market to 
Japanese producers would be inequitable considering the fact that the Japanese 
steel industry had been developed far stronger than the Thai industry, with heavy 
subsidies from the Japanese government‖. 38  These producers sought the 
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government to grant protection continuously as they needed more time to develop 
their manufacturing and to improve their competitiveness to the world market 
standard. Moreover, they claimed that ―removing protection of hot-rolled steel 
under the agreement would create unfair treatment between local steel 
manufacturers and automotive makers‖. 39  In relation to this, a joint press 
conference were held by the Thai Chamber of Commerce (TCC) and Federation 
of Thai Industries (FTI) to ―criticize the government for considering ending tariffs 
on Japanese hot-rolled steel imports and insisted that protection was needed in 
order to avoid the Thai industry would be controlled by Japan and the whole 
country suffering from an increased trade deficit caused by a flood of Japanese 
imports‖.40  
 
Furthermore, FTI also urged the government to exclude steel from 
JTEPA‘s negotiation as they feared that local steel manufacturers would be at 
―serious disadvantage‖ if steel be included in the JTEPA‘s concession.41 In order 
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to protect domestic high-quality steel industry which was still at nascent stage, the 
FTI‘s steel club proposed to the government to impose import quotas/quota 
restriction on types of steel that cannot be produced locally as the free flow of 
Japanese steel would wipe out this industry.  
 
Apart from the steel industry, opposition to market opening and request for 
government protection also came from domestic car component manufacturers. 
The prospect of cutting tariffs on completely built-up (CBU) vehicles and car 
components raised strong concern among this industry. ―Thai auto parts 
manufacturers expressed strong opposition to a plan to reduce tariffs on imported 
Japanese automobiles with engines larger than 3,000cc under the proposed 
JTEPA‖.42 To pressure the government to protect the local auto-parts industry, 
the Thai Auto Parts Manufacturers Association (TAPMA) organized a press 
conference to warn the government that ―the local car-parts industry would be 
wiped out by a flood of Japanese parts and Thailand would suffer a parts trade 
deficit and billion losses in import tax revenues if FTA is signed‖.43  
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To further pressurize the government, TAPMA had ―petitioned Prime 
Minister and related ministers to exclude auto parts from the FTA framework‖.44 
TAPMA expressed its concern that any removal or reduction of import tariffs on 
CBU cars and parts would give great impact to local industries as cheap imports 
would led to a decreased demand for locally made products. In relation to this, 
local customers would also tend to shift their preference ―to consume imported 
large-engine vehicles instead of locally assembled cars with smaller engines‖.45 
To avoid severe injuries to the domestic auto parts industry, TAPMA also urged 
the government ―to extend timeframes for any tariff reductions by 10-15 years to 
provide local producers with time to adjust themselves to greater competition in 
the future‖.46  
 
The similar concern was also shared by the FTI and Board of Trade, two 
of the country‘s largest business associations. Both groups organized a joint press 
conference, urging ―the Thaksin government to overhaul its proposed free-trade 
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pact with Japan or scrap the proposed deal altogether, feeling that the deal is 
unbalanced and wreak havoc on crucial domestic industries‖.47 Both business 
groups asserted that ―an FTA with Japan would result in massive damage to the 
automotive, auto parts and steel industries in Thailand, while the Kingdom stands 
to gain little by having access to Japan‘s agricultural market‖.48 This action was 
made amid news that ―it became likely that the negotiation would not grant 
benefits to possible Thai products as much as hoped for‖ (Peamsilpakulchorn, 
2006: 21). FTI and Board of Trade also echoed the move made by TAPMA by 
expressing their concern on behalf of the industry through press conference held. 
Both groups pushed the government to protect the industry by gradually reduced 
the tariffs in order to give breathing space to the industry to fairly compete with 
Japanese imports.  
 
Protection for the auto industry was not only seeks by domestic auto parts 
producers per se, instead the American and European automakers also aligned 
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themselves with those groups to pressurize the Thai government to ensure that 
their investment in Thailand is well safeguarded. The top executives of eight 
non-Japanese car companies (General Motors (Thailand) Ltd; Land Rover 
(Thailand); DaimlerChrysler (Thailand) Ltd; BMW (Thailand) Ltd; Volvo Car 
(Thailand) Ltd; Ford Operations (Thailand) Ltd; Jaguar Cars (Thailand) and Thai 
Yarnyon Co Ltd, (Volkswagen and Audi importers) sent a letter to Deputy Prime 
Minister, Somkid, other ministers and Thai chief negotiators to urge the 
government to maintain tariffs on vehicles with engine over 3,000cc. They feared 
that the lifting of the particular tariffs would ―create Japanese monopoly, 
restricting consumers choice and with the potential for monopolistic price-setting 
in the future‖.49 They also warned that ―the product strategies and longer-term 
automotive industry investment plans of the European and American 
manufacturers would likely be abandoned and the choice of Thailand as a regional 
production hub would be reviewed in search of a more favorable environment 
where there continues to be a viable domestic market‖.50  
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 The lobbying efforts made by local industrial players and business groups 
directly had influence on the negotiation process of JTEPA. The efforts led Thai policy 
makers to revisit concession negotiated by both Thai and Japanese side. For instance, 
due to massive protest from domestic steel producers after controversial stance made by 
Commerce Minister and aggressive move from the Japanese side to seek for new 
concessions, Thai negotiators warned that they would put back agricultural issues on 
the negotiation table if the Japanese side continue to pressure the Thai side to liberalize 
the steel sector. The lobbying efforts made by these groups further forced Prime 
Minister Thaksin to interfere by seeking cooperation from Prime Minister Koizumi to 
solve the deadlock of JTEPA‘s negotiation. For example, it was reported that in order 
to rescue the JTEPA‘s deal and to ensure that the deal could be concluded within the 
deadline, Prime Minister Thaksin had wrote to Koizumi and made two suggestions to 
accelerate the negotiation process. Thaksin proposed ―either both countries could take 
sensitive issues off the negotiation table by signing for a limited deal that was high in 
symbolism but low on free trade, or alternatively if Japan offered concession on 
agriculture, Thailand would consider faster removal of its steel and auto tariffs.‖51   
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 Strong societal actors‘ oppositions were apparent in the JTEPA‘s case. 
The lobbying efforts made by the industrial players and business groups indeed 
gave a significant influence on the negotiation process of the JTEPA. The strong 
coalition among these groups contributed to an organized opposition efforts with a 
strong voice in expressing their concerns on the ongoing JTEPA‘s negotiation. 
This coalition also managed to force the Thai government to reconsider their 
business views and concerns and to one extent made the government to 
incorporate their proposal into the agreement. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 Thailand had implemented various industrial policies in developing its 
automotive and steel industries under both, the ISI and EOI. The policies 
implemented under the ISI include import restrictions such as import ban, import 
quota, import tariffs, local content requirement and so forth. Policies implemented 
under the EOI include import tax exemptions on raw materials, intermediate 
goods and machinery used to produce exported goods, export duties exemption, 
Free Trade Zones (FTZ) and so forth. These policies undoubtedly turned the 
industries into prosperous sectors.  
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 Although Thailand currently fully pursued for the EOI which gave greater 
emphasize on export promotion activities, protective industrial policies adopted 
under the ISI such as import tariffs and import quota still intact and being 
implemented. The protective policies applied to the auto and steel sectors became 
a contentious issue in the JTEPA‘s negotiation as Japan requested and insisted 
Thailand to reduce or completely abolish those policies. The request was accepted 
in a mix manner by the Thais officials as diverse preferences exist among them 
towards the JTEPA. Lack of cohesion among government officials and 
coordination between the authorities in policy making process led to a contrast 
mandate given to the negotiators in negotiating for the JTEPA. This further made 
the negotiation chaotic and unsmooth. However, towards the end, policy 
preference of high ranking officials‘ to liberalize domestic market toppled any 
preference for continuous protection and gave more influence on the negotiation 
process.  
 
 This policy preference of high ranking officials and their attempt for 
market liberalization also garnered negative reaction from certain business groups 
especially those from the import-competing industries - the auto parts and steel 
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industries as well as from non-Japanese automakers. Strong coalition and 
organized efforts made by these groups in expressing their business concerns 
significantly influenced the negotiation process. Their actions also gave a strong 
signal to the government on how a vigilant action and decision should be made to 
safeguard the national interests. This action further forced the government to 
revisit its negotiated concession and stance to accommodate the request and at the 
same time hold its quest for trade agenda. 
 
 Past industrial policies and its nature also have a strong linkage with 
responses made by both, government officials and societal actors towards the 
negotiation process of the JTEPA. As an authority which was responsible for 
industrial development, the MOI had formulated various policies to support the 
development of the industry. Therefore, as the JTEPA would distort the industry‘s 
development if the protective policies be lifted, the MOI‘s officials responded by 
resisting to reduce or eliminate those policies to continue to protect the industries. 
On the other hand, previous liberalization efforts made by the Thai government by 
gradual reducing of the protective policies inspired the high ranking officials‘ to 
continuously liberalize the market to make it competitive.  
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 In addition, nature of past industrial policies which was based on 
private-led with less government‘s involvement also linked to responses made by 
the officials‘ and societal actors‘. Minimal government‘s involvement in the 
industry with no interests to be kept made the officials‘ less obliged to retain the 
protective industrial policies. In contrary, high private involvements in the 
industries created for a strong business foundation with strong and organized 
coalition among themselves in expressing their opposition towards the JTEPA.  
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CHAPTER 4: JAPAN-MALAYSIA ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
(JMEPA) 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 Malaysia is one of the developing countries in Southeast Asia which 
experienced a vigorous economic growth in the early 1990s before severely 
affected by the Asian financial crisis 1997-98 and quickly recovered after the 
crisis. The economic prosperity was supplemented among other with its economic 
linkage with Japan. Both countries had established close ties in terms of bilateral 
trade and investment since the past few decades. The relationship between these 
two countries was further enhanced with the adaptation of the ―Look East‖ 
policy
52
 by the Malaysian government. This policy which could be regarded as an 
attempt to emulate Japan‘s modernization becomes a key foundation for Malaysia 
in formulating its economic strategies for the development of the country. 
Bilateral trade and investments had also expanded remarkably after the 
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implementation of this policy where Japan became one of the most important 
trading partners for Malaysia and vice versa. ―In 2002, Japan was the 3rd largest 
export destination for Malaysia (US$10.4 billion, accounting for 11.2% of total 
exports) and the largest source of import (US$14.2 billion, accounting for 17.8% 
of total imports). For Japan, Malaysia ranked the 10th largest trade partner for 
export (1.38 trillion Japanese Yen, 2.6%) and 10th largest trade partner for import 
(1.40 trillion Japanese Yen, 3.3%)‖ (MOFA, 2003: 4). During this period, ―86.6 
percent of export from Malaysia to Japan consisted of industrial goods, while the 
remaining 13.4 percent being agriculture, forestry and fishery items. Almost all 
the exports from Japan to Malaysia were industrial goods‖.53 In 2002, Japan 
became the 2
nd
 largest foreign direct investor in Malaysia with the investment 
mainly concentrated in manufacturing sectors. Currently (as of April 2010), Japan 
remains as the 3
rd
 largest export destination for Malaysia (10.2% of total 
Malaysia‘s export) after Singapore and China.54 In terms of FDI, currently (as of 
March 2010), Japan was recorded as the 3
rd
 largest investors in Malaysia (with 
investment amounted to US$131 million) after Singapore and China, dropped 
                                                          
53
 ibid. 
54 According to MITI‘s statistic, Japan became 3rd largest export destination for Malaysia from 
2005 to current (except for 2009, Japan became 4
th
 largest export destination after China).  
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from its previous position as the top investor in 2009 (investment of US$2,058 
million).
55
  
 
In developing the economy, Malaysia has adopted several industrialization 
strategies which attached with various protective policies to safeguard the 
domestic economy. Despite the obligation for trade liberalization under the 
auspices of the WTO and the bilateral and regional trade arrangements, Malaysia 
also committed itself to liberalize the domestic market. However in doing so, 
Malaysia still preserved protections for its industrial sectors which were regarded 
as the engine of growth of its economic development. As the proliferations of 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements were intensified in East Asian region 
since the early 2000 and Malaysia had joined this FTA bandwagon, it would be 
interesting to observe how the Malaysian government negotiated for a free trade 
with the backdrop of various protections granted to the industrial sectors.  
 
 
                                                          
55
 Information from Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA). Projects Approved by  
Major Countries. 
http://www.mida.gov.my/en_v2/index.php?page=projects-approved-by-major-country 
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This chapter will then focus on the first FTA for Malaysia which was 
signed with Japan on 23 May 2006. This chapter will be organized as follow. In 
the first part of the chapter, I will give an overview of industrialization process in 
Malaysia and industrial policies adopted during this time. Further, in order to 
know what kind of industrial policies adopted by Malaysia, focus will be given on 
policies implemented on two key sectors in Malaysia, namely, the automotive and 
steel sectors which became the central discussions in the JMEPA‘s negotiations. 
In the second part of this chapter, I will concentrate on JMEPA by providing an 
overview of the JMEPA including its outcomes and negotiation process. Given 
the importance of the protective industrial policies as a backdrop, the third part of 
this chapter will then discuss on how past policy trends to foster specific industrial 
sectors namely the automotive and steel influenced the negotiation process of 
JMEPA by analyzing government officials‘ preferences and societal actors‘ 
responses towards JMEPA. The final part of the chapter will provide the findings 
and conclusion for the chapter.         
   
4.2 Overview of Malaysia’s Industrial Policy 
 Malaysia was regarded as one of the robust economies in South East Asia. 
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The driving force behind the remarkable economic growth for the last few 
decades was the industrialization. Since its independence in August 1957, the 
Malaysian economy had undergone several structural changed in its 
industrialization strategies. The Malaysian industrialization went through two 
stages; the ISI and the EOI. For many developing countries, including Malaysia, 
the ISI was considered as an appropriate strategy to be opted to jump-start their 
economy. According to Alavi (1996: 34), ―the ISI strategies had been adopted in 
developing countries mainly for two major reasons; (1) to cope with external trade 
imbalances and (2) to promote industrialization‖. For Malaysia, the adaptation of 
the ISI strategies/regime somehow has contributed to its economic growth at the 
early stage of its economic development.  
 
 Malaysian industrial strategies went through four developmental stages 
under the ISI and EOI. The ISI was categorized into two phases with the first 
stage concentrated on consumer goods and the later concentrated on intermediate 
and capital goods of heavy industries, both with the aim to replace imports. 
Details of the adopted developmental stages and industrial policies were shown in 
Table 5. 
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   Table 5: Stages of Industrial Strategies in Malaysia (1957-1990s) 
Phase  Industrial 
Strategy  
Industrial Policy  Government Emphasis  
Phase 1  ISI strategy 
(1957-1970)  
 Pioneer 
Industrial 
Ordinance, 1958  
- -  Simple consumer 
goods 
- -  Domestic market 
oriented  
Phase 2  EOI strategy 
(1970-1980)  
 Investment 
Incentives Act, 
1968 
 Industrial 
Coordination 
Act, 1975 
- Export orientation 
- labor intensive 
- Free Trade Zones  
(FTZ) 
- Electronic and textile 
for exports  
Phase 3  ISI strategy 
(1980-1985)  
 Heavy Industries 
policy  
- Consumer durables, 
intermediate and 
capital goods 
- Domestic market 
oriented  
Phase 4  EOI strategy 
(1980s- 
1990s)  
 Industrial Master 
Plan 1986 
 Promotion of 
Investment Act 
1986  
- Resource-based 
industries 
-  Capital intensive 
-  Encourage of exports  
Source: ―Industrialization in Malaysia: import substitution and infant industry‖. Alavi  
(1996: 32) 
 
During the first phase of the ISI strategy, the government endorsed the 
Pioneer Industrial Ordinance (PIO) in 1958 to promote the establishment of new 
industries to subordinate imports. In 1966, the Federal Industrial Development 
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Authority (currently was changed to the Malaysian Industrial Development 
Authority/MIDA) was established to support policies outlined by the PIO. Under 
this strategy, tariff and non-tariff protections became major policy tools to 
promote the development of local industries especially to support the growth of 
newborn industries. Protections granted to the industries had helped them to fulfill 
the domestic demand. ―The existing structure of protection fostered the growth of 
the manufacturing sector, especially pioneer industries‖ (Djeck, Linneman & 
Verbruggen, 1987: 364). However, as the market was relatively small, industrial 
expansion took place at the earlier stage of the ISI strategy and the growth was 
stifled when the limit of domestic market was reached. In addition to this, 
―linkage effects with the rest of the economy were also weak and limited‖ (Alavi 
1996: 35).  
 
Due to several weaknesses of the ISI, the Malaysian government, starting 
from 1970 changed the industrialization strategy by adopting the EOI to promote 
exports which was foreseen could created spillover effects to other industries as 
well as generated more jobs and reduced unemployment. ―Under the first phase of 
the EOI, two industrial policies were formulated by the Malaysian government, 
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Investment Incentive Act, 1968 and Industrial Coordination Act, 1975. The 
Investment Incentive Act was invented to encourage more foreign investors into 
export-oriented activities‖ (Alavi, 1996: 37). However, like the previous ISI 
strategy, ―this first EOI strategy also failed as concentration only given into 
industries/activities which were located in Free Trade Zones (FTZs) which were 
dominant by electrical and textile industries‖.56 This strategy has divided the 
local industries into two different worlds. Under the FTZs, the industries were 
granted free imports of raw materials for producing goods mainly for exports and 
limited sales in the domestic market. While for industries outside the FTZs, they 
were subject to a higher production cost as the government imposed import duties 
on the imported raw materials. Therefore, the EOI failed to develop economic 
linkages between those two as dual contrasting policies and strategies were 
adopted at the same time. The EOI also had undermined the ISI policies which 
were formulated to assist local industries to be domestically and internationally 
competitive. 
 
 
                                                          
56
 ibid., pg. 43. 
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The failure of the first phase of EOI strategy was then replaced with the 
introduction of the second phase of the ISI strategy in the early 1980s. Inspired by 
the successful story of Japan‘s and South Korea‘s heavy industrialization, the 
Malaysian government under Mahathir‘s administration invented the heavy 
industry policies. The Government thought that the development of heavy 
industries would foster higher economic growth through strong ―backward and 
forward linkages between industries‖ (Alavi, 1996: 43). Under this strategy, the 
government was deeply involved in developing Malaysian heavy industries 
through joint-venture with several foreign companies in few strategic industries 
such as the automotive and steel sectors. During this second phase of the ISI 
strategy, tariff protections was once again became the primary tool for the 
government in developing the heavy industries.  
 
Besides tariff protections, several other incentives were also provided to the 
industries to accelerate the growth. According to Alavi (1996: 43), ―the re-emphasis 
of the ISI strategy had not only increased the import duties on priority items, but they 
had been given further protections through price control, import restriction, duty 
exemption and other investment incentives under the pioneer status‖.  
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Nevertheless, ―the development of Malaysian heavy industries promoted 
under the ISI seemed to be unsatisfactory and problematic‖ (Machado, 1989).57 
Due to the weak performance and slow growth of the state-owned industries, the 
government then shifted to the second phase of the EOI strategy to accelerate the 
economic growth by inviting more foreign investments. The Promoted Investment 
Act, 1986 was introduced for this purpose. Under this Act, full foreign ownership 
was allowed for foreign companies with the condition that they must be 
export-oriented companies and their exports had to reach certain required level as 
ratio to domestic sale. In 1986, Malaysia also visualized its First Industrial Master 
Plan (IMP) which charted the way or plan for the industries (especially 
manufacturing sector) to be developed from 1986 to 1995. This First IMP then 
followed by the Second IMP, 1996-2005. The 2
nd
 IMP ―deepened the 
development of the manufacturing sector which led to increased value-added 
activities, enhanced productivity, greater industry linkages as well as growth of 
                                                          
57
  Machado stated that PROTON and Perwaja were plagued with serious problems and recorded 
large losses in their early years. He further stated that Mahathir attributed the troubles of both 
industries primarily to the shrinkage of the domestic markets for autos and steel owing to the 
mid-1980s recession, the mounting costs of debt service following yen appreciation, and to 
management inadequacies.  
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manufacturing-related services‖.58 Besides the IMPs, the industrial policies were 
also pursued along with the periodical 5 years economic plans i.e the Malaysia 
Plan (MP) which was began in 1966.
59
    
 
Apart from the above explanation on industrialization and industrial 
policies, it is worthwhile to discuss on Bumiputera policy which is broadly 
adopted and applied to most of the industrial policies along the industrialization 
process.
60
 This policy emerged due to an ethnic clash that erupted after the 
parliamentary election in May 1969. This event forced the Malaysian government 
to regulate policies aimed at eliminating economic disparities and forming 
national unity in Malaysia. In conjunction with this incident, the government 
crafted New Economic Policy (NEP) with the objectives to reduce poverty and to 
re-distribute economic wealth among races by giving attention to indigenous 
                                                          
58 The Star. ―Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi‘s speech at the official launch 
of the Third Industrial Master Plan 2006-2020‖. 18 August 2006. 
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2006/8/18/nation/20060818164726&sec=nation 
 
59 The 1st MP (1966-1970), 2nd MP (1971-75), 3rd MP (1976-80), 4th MP (1981-85), 5th MP 
(1986-90), 6
th
 MP (1990-95), 7
th
 MP (1996-2000), 8
th
 MP (2001-2005) and currently Malaysia 
is implementing its 9
th
 MP (2006-2010).   
 
60 Bumiputera means ‗son of the soil‘ in particular indigenous Malay ethnic. 
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Bumiputera, particularly the Malay ethnic. The objectives were carried out under 
the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-75) and other subsequent Plans.  
 
The Second Plan clearly stated that ―economic policies and development 
would be considered in their relationship to social development in general and the 
over-riding needs for national unity in particular‖ (The 2MP, pg. 2). Under the 
second prong
61
 of the NEP, the government tried to close the economic gap 
between races through a process of which ―involves the modernization of rural 
life, a rapid and balanced growth of urban activities and the creation of a Malay 
commercial and industrial community in all categories and at all levels of 
operation, so that Malays and other indigenous people would became full partners 
in all aspects of the economic life of the nation‖. 62  Due to this social 
responsibility, the government broadly intervened into business through the 
formation of business organization such as the National Corporation (PERNAS), 
Urban Development Authority (UDA), and etc., inevitably to represent the 
                                                          
61
 The NEP outlined two prongs. The first prong is to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, by 
rising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective 
of race. The second prong aims at accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian society 
to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of 
race with economic function (The Second MP, p1).  
62
 ibid., pg. 1. 
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Bumiputera. According to Taylor (2007: 91), ―a major objective of the 
government‘s participation in the corporate sector of the economy was to increase 
the ownership and control of the corporate wealth for the Malay community‖63.  
 
In line with this aspiration, the government also creatively formulated 
industrial policies which favored for Bumiputera‘s participation such as under the 
Industrial Coordination Act, 1975, a 30 per cent Bumiputera equity was required before 
license granted to a new manufacturing company.
64
 In addition to this, the 30 per cent 
Bumiputera equity was also applied to companies seeking to be public listed into Bursa 
Malaysia (formerly known as KLSE). The heavy industry policy also became a means 
for the government to advance the Bumiputera. According to Jomo (1994: 269), 
―state-sponsorship for heavy industry was seen as a way to strengthen the economic 
position of the indigenous Bumiputera to better achieve the ethnic redistribution targets 
set by the NEP‖.  
                                                          
63
 The NEP targeted the 30 per cent Bumiputera equity ownership in corporate sector in 20 years 
period ended by 1990. This policy was further continued with the fact that the targeted 
percentage was unachieved in the given period.    
64 Requirement for 30 per cent Bumiputera equity was relaxed and 100% foreign equity holding is 
allowed for all investments in new projects effective from 17 June 2003. 
http://www.mida.gov.my/en_v2/index.php?page=government-policies 
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4.2.1 Policy on the Automotive Industry 
The automotive industry was regarded as the most important industry or 
the key industry in Malaysia which became central for the economic development 
strategies. The industry had spilled over effects to other industries. ―The industry 
brings together an immense variety of components and parts
65
, many of which are 
manufactured by independent supplier firms in other industries such as textile, 
glass, plastics, electronic, rubber, steel and other metals‖ (Abdulsomad, 1999: 
274). Due to this nature and joint-venture, the industry was expected to bring 
more employment as well as technological transfer to Malaysia. 
 
The Malaysian automotive industry started in the 1960s under the ISI 
strategy to substitute imports of CBUs.
66
 The government policies towards the 
industry could be linked to two different development stages. The first stage was 
encouraging local assembly and content (1967-1982) while the second phase 
(1983 to present) started after the government launched the national car project 
(Abdulsomad, 1999 and Jomo, 2007). Before the implementation of the ISI 
                                                          
65
 An automobile is a complex product, consisting of about 3,000 parts and components. 
 
66 Malaysia was previously highly depending on imports of passenger cars (CBU) to satisfy its 
local demand. This import dependence was further forced the government to develop its 
national car project in 1980s with the establishment of PROTON. 
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strategy, Malaysia relied heavily on imports of CBU cars from the Europe. During 
the ISI regime, with the aim to substitute imports and develop local automotive 
industry, ―the government policies had moved towards protective promotion of 
local automobile assembly using CKD kits‖ (Jomo, 2007: 127).  
 
In 1963, a policy to promote an integrated automobile industry was 
developed. To accelerate the substitution of imports and to create employment, 
the Malaysian government had encouraged for the establishment of assembly 
plants to assemble automobiles and manufacture the components/parts of 
automobile. In the late 1967, the Motor Vehicle Assembler Committee (MVAC), 
an inter-departmental agency set up under MITI to oversee the automobile 
industry, granted approval to six assembly plants to start operation in Malaysia 
namely; (1) Kelang Pembena Kereta Sdn. Bhd. (Fiat and Mitsubishi); (2) Swedish 
Motor Assemblers Sdn. Bhd. (Volvo); (3) Oriental Assemblers Sdn. Bhd. (Honda 
and Peugeot); (4) Cycle & Carriage Bintang Bhd. (Mercedes Benz); (5) Assembly 
Services Sdn. Bhd. (Toyota and Daihatsu); and (6) Associated Industries Malaysia 
Sdn. Bhd. (Ford, Chrysler and Land Rover) (Abdulsomad,1999; Jomo, 2007). In 
1977, another five assemblers were approved to form a total of 11 assemblers in 
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the industry by 1980.
67
 To strengthen and foster Malaysian industrial base, the 
government had introduced a local content requirement policy for assemblers. 
According to Jomo (2007, 168), ―the government targeted expansion of local 
content to 40 per cent by weight over a ten-year period beginning 1971‖. 
Subsequently, ―the local content requirement has been increased from 10 per cent 
in 1971 to 35 per cent in 1982 (expansion by approximately 3 per cent per year)‖ 
(Abdulsomad, 1999: 277). However, the industries were found not satisfied the 
local content requirement. By end of 1970s, the industries‘ actual average local 
content was only 8 per cent which was far in reaching the targeted local content 
for the automotive industry. ―This local content were only limited to certain auto 
parts such as tyres, batteries, paints, filters, seat-belts, and glass items‖ (Jomo, 
2007: 168). During this time, ―automobile industry contributed little to the 
national economy because the industry relied excessively on CKD assembly 
which generating little or no value-added profit for Malaysia‖ (Yoshimatsu, 2000: 
186).  
 
                                                          
67
 ibid. 
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Due to the slow pace for localization of automotive industry, necessity to 
enhance local industrial based and also due to the need to balance the 
socio-economic between ethnic groups, the government decided to intervene and 
directly involved in the industry.
68
 This involvement had been marked as a start 
for a second phase of development in the government policies on the automotive 
industry. In 1984, the Malaysian government launched its first ‗national car‘ 
project, Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional (PROTON), which was a joint-venture 
project between governments‘ wholly-owned Heavy Industries Corporation of 
Malaysia (HICOM) and Japan‘s MNCs. Later in 1992, the Malaysian government 
launched the second ‗national-car‘ project, Perusahaan Otomobil Kedua 
(PERODUA) to produce passenger cars with smaller engines capacity for 
domestic sales. Being regarded as a national-car, PROTON and PERODUA were 
highly supported and protected by the government. ―It enjoyed various kind of 
preferential treatment from the state, including reduction and exemption from 
import duties and sales tax, low interest rate loans and technical, financial and 
                                                          
68
  Due to race riots on 16 May 1969, Malaysian government has given priority to close the 
economic disparity between Bumiputera (the indigenous Malays) and other races in Malaysia. 
The NEP is launched in 1971 aiming for poverty eradication and socio-economic restructuring 
by the way of increasing Bumiputera‘s participation in economic function. The agenda was 
further applied to other government policy including heavy industries policy under Mahathir‘s 
administration.   
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other assistance via a special vendor development programme for developing 
Bumiputera parts and component manufacturers‖ (Jomo, 2007: 168).  
 
Apart from national carmakers, the local parts suppliers were also well 
supported and protected by the government. In line with the local content 
requirement, ―the government had introduced a Mandatory Deletion Programme 
in 1980 to prohibit local car producers, or franchisors from importing all 
automobile parts and components listed as ‗mandatory deleted components‘ for 
use in local automobile assembly‖ (Rosli, 2006: 96). 69  Under this 
programme/scheme, all assemblers and car makers were forced to procure the 
listed parts and component from local suppliers in order to develop the auto parts 
industry and also to enhance localization of automobile industry. This programme, 
however was discontinued with effect from, 1 January 2004.
70
  
 
To further foster the automotive industry, the government had come out 
with a revised local content policy in 1991. Under this policy, manufacturers of 
                                                          
69
 According to Yoshimatsu (2000: 187), there are 25-30 important parts which were listed as the 
compulsory items that must be procured locally. 
 
70
 Information from MITI‘s documents (unpublished). 
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passenger vehicles less than 1,850cc are required to increase local content up to 
60 per cent by 1996 where for vehicles with engine capacity in range between 
1,851cc to 2,850cc were required to increase local content up to 45 per cent in 
1996. Table 6 showed details of the revised local content requirement. 
 
Table 6: Local Content Requirement for Passenger Cars, 1992-1996 
Auto-type/category Local content requirement (%) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Passenger vehicles up to 1850cc 30 40 50 55 60 
Passenger vehicles 1,851 to 
2,850cc 
20 30 35 40 45 
  Source: MACPMA and MIDA as cited in Rosli (2006) 
 
In compliance with AFTA‘s commitment, the Malaysian government then 
abolished the local content requirement starting from 1 January 2002. In addition 
to local content requirement, ―Malaysia also imposed high tariffs on imported 
CBUs and CKDs in order to promote auto-assemblers to source out parts locally‖ 
(Rosli, 2006: 95). In 1998, the government had increased import duties on CBU 
and CKD for cars 2,000cc and above from original 42 per cent to a new rate 
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ranging from 60 – 80 per cent according to the engine capacity.71 This protection, 
however, did not last long. Due to its compliance with the AFTA agreement, in 
2005, Malaysia had reduced the import duties for CKD and CBU of all categories 
of vehicles from ASEAN countries to 20 per cent and vehicles imported from 
non-ASEAN were subjected to import duties of 10 to 50 per cent.
72
 At the same 
time, a high excise duties (60 - 100 per cent) were imposed on all vehicles in 
order to give equal treatment to both local as well as imported vehicles.
73
 In 
addition to this, national car makers were also granted a 50 per cent rebate on 
excise tax which gave weight to Proton and Perodua against its competitors.  
 
Apart from tariffs, other non-tariff barriers such as import licensing 
through Approval Permit (AP) system was also enforced by the government on 
imports of CKD and CBU.
74
 Under this system, imports were only permitted up to 
                                                          
71
 ibid. 
72
 Imports from non-ASEAN: CKD for Passenger Car/MPV/4WD/Van (10% import duty), CKD 
for Bus and Lorry (zero duty), CKD for Motorcycle (0-10% duty), CBU for Passenger 
Car/MPV/4WD/Van (50%), CBU for Bus (30%), CBU for Lorry (35-50%), CBU for 
Motorcycle (40%).  
 
73
 MITI‘s document (unpublished). 
 
74  The AP system was introduced in 1970 with the objective of promoting and providing 
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10 per cent of total local production of passenger cars, and importers needed to 
apply to MITI to get approval for number of cars that could be imported. Certain 
criteria and requirements needed to be fulfilled and evaluated by the AP 
committee before any approval granted. For CBU, ―APs on passenger cars were 
divided into two categories; the non-franchise APs (open APs) for new/used 
passenger car and MPV and the franchise APs for specific makes and models of 
passenger car and MPV‖.75 For new franchise company, the AP would only be 
given if the company fulfilled certain criteria/requirement includes ―models were 
not been assembled/ marketed in Malaysia and 70 per cent company‘s equity was 
held by Bumiputera‖.76 
 
 Protection granted by the government to the automotive sector through 
protective industrial policies gave advantages to the state-owned companies 
relative to the other private companies. Due to huge investment onto the sector, the 
                                                                                                                                                               
opportunities for Bumiputera entrepreneurs in the automotive sector. 
75
Policy On Approved Permit (AP) For Motor Vehicle, 7th January 2005 
http://www.miti.gov.my/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.article.Article_ec961044-7f000010-
16251625-732bbf7b 
76 MITI‘s Aministrative Guideline (unpublished). 
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Malaysian government creatively crafted policies which gave weight to the 
state-owned companies. Many of those policies also associated the Bumiputera‘s 
policy agenda which resulted for uncompetitive industry. High government‘s 
involvement in the auto industry further discouraged private investment which in 
turn negatively affected the developmental progress on the auto industry.   
  
4.2.2 Policy on the Steel Industry 
 The steel industry in Malaysia could be categorized into two main 
segments, namely the long products and the flat products. ―Long products 
included billets, steel bars, sections and wire products which were used mainly in 
construction and civil engineering such as wire mesh, nails, bolts and nuts, wire 
rods and barbed wire. On the other hand, flat products include hot rolled coils 
(HRC), cold rolled coils (CRC), coated steel coils, electro galvanised iron (EGI) 
which were used as intermediate raw materials for downstream applications of 
manufacturing process such as automotive parts and component, electrical and 
electronics appliances, water pipes and roofing sheets‖.77 Therefore, it could be 
said that steel industry served as a backbone to other industries.  
                                                          
77
 MITI. ―Policy Review on Iron and Steel Industry‖ (unpublished). 
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The Malaysian steel industry started in the early 1960s along with the 
implementation of the ISI strategy. In the earlier stage of the ISI, there were three 
companies in operation to manufacture galvanized iron sheet primarily for roofing 
purposes.
78
 The industry then expanded with the establishment of Direct Reduced 
Iron (DRI) plant, billets and steel bars in the 1970s and 1980s. Given the 
importance of steel industry and economic linkages created by this particular 
industry, the government regarded this industry as a key industry for development. 
With the adaptation of policy on heavy industries in the 1980s, Malaysia started to 
give higher priority to the steel industry, along with the automotive industry. In 
1982, to rationalize the steel industry and to reduce dependence on imports, the 
government started to fully involve in the industry through the establishment of 
Perwaja Terengganu Sdn. Bhd., a joint-venture company with Nippon Steel 
Corporation (NSC). Similar with other state-led projects i.e Proton, Perwaja was 
also granted a high protection by the government. Perwaja had enjoyed various 
tax incentives including tax holidays under Pioneer status as well as tax 
exemptions on a few imported raw materials.  
                                                          
78
 MITI. ―Historical Development of Malaysia Iron and Steel Industry‖ in Policy Review on Iron 
and Steel Industry. The established manufacturers are Federal Iron Works, Selangor (1960), 
Southern Iron and Steel Works, Penang (1965) and Ann Joo Steel Sdn Bhd, Penang (1961). 
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In the 1990s, the Malaysian steel industry is further expanded into 
manufacturing of flat products such as HRC and CRC with the establishment of 
Megasteel Sdn. Bhd., the first integrated steel mill in Malaysia to produce flat 
steel products and the only producer of hot-rolled products in the country. ―The 
introduction of Megasteel signifies the government‘s intention to ensure a ready 
supply for the development of the manufacturing and construction sectors and 
thus, removing its vulnerability to imports‖.79 Unfortunately, the Asian financial 
crises in 1997-98 distorted the development of steel sector. Therefore, in 
addressing the impact of the crisis and in order to protect the industry, the 
Malaysian government had imposed ―import tariff of 0-25 per cent on a wide 
range of flat products (HRC, CRC and EGI) in April 1999‖.80 
 
In 2002, due to the surplus in the global steel market resulted from 
overcapacity in production by major steel producers and also introduction of 
safeguard measures by the United States on steel products, the government had 
introduced several protective policies in order to protect local steel industry from 
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 MBAM‘s Report. 19 June 2007. 
 
80 MITI. ―Historical Development of Malaysia Iron and Steel Industry‖. 
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available cheap imports. ―Effective on 15 March 2002, the government had 
increased import duties between 30-50 per cent on HRC, hot-rolled coils pickled 
and oiled, CRC, electro galvanized, steel rods, galvanized steel coils and steel 
pipes‖.81 ―The hike was significant as previously, HRC were subjected to a 
maximum of only 25 per cent tariff, CRC to a maximum of 10 per cent and steel 
pipes to duties of around 20 per cent or less‖.82 Imports of these iron & steel 
products were also subjected to Approval Permit (AP) issued by MITI.
83
 In 
addition, the government continues to maintain import duties for long products at 
10 to 30 per cent and the requirement of AP for imports was also maintained for 
this products. The government also introduced the determination of a quarterly 
HRC base price which was monitored and fixed quarterly by MITI to ensure 
domestic selling price was competitive and in line with the international price.
84
 
In relation to this, in the same year i.e 2002, import duty exemptions were granted 
to seven sectors namely the automotive and components, electrical and electronics, 
shipbuilding and ship repairing, petroleum and gas, steel furniture, exporting 
                                                          
81 MITI. ―Historical Development of Malaysia Iron and Steel Industry‖. 
82
 MBAM‘s Report. 19 June 2007.  
 
83 MITI‘s Document. ―Guidelines for Import Duty Exemption and Approved Permit (AP) on Iron 
and Steel Products Effective 15 March 2002‖. 
 
84
 MITI‘s Document. ― Policy Review of Iron and Steel Industry‖. 
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companies and companies located in FTZ/LMW.
85
 ―Exemptions had also been 
given to industries that were unable to source their products locally but they must 
submitted applications to the government for licenses that exempted them from 
the tariff‖.86  
 
Similar to the automotive industry, high government‘s involvement in the 
steel industry also resulted for an increase in number of protective industrial 
policies. Market monopoly by certain company further dominated the scene as the 
government had crafted policies in favor of this company in order to ensure for its 
development and survival after huge capital investment poured by them in the 
industry. Even though the protective policies managed to foster the steel industry, 
at the same time it discouraged private investments that have potential to further 
develop and enhance the industry‘s competitiveness.   
 
                                                          
85
 Effective from 1 August 2009, import duty exemption for these seven selected sectors was 
abolished, since it is no longer relevant, as the policy review on tariff reduction structure has 
taken into consideration the requirement for these sectors. 
 
86
 MBAM‘s Report. 
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4.2.3 Nature of Malaysia’s Past Industrial Policy 
Industrialization undoubtedly propelled Malaysian economy. Along the 
industrialization process, two approaches were taken by the government in 
implementing industrial policies. In the earlier stage, the Malaysian government 
introduced various incentives to stimulate private investments in selected sectors 
in order to substitute imports and develop those sectors. This approach could be 
regarded as a private-led development model. During this time, private sectors 
were encouraged to establish firms producing products which are listed under 
promoted industries such as the automotive and steel products. As to acquire for 
technological transfer, a joint-venture firms were also allowed to operate on 
accelerating the development of the industries. At this juncture, the government 
hoped that incentives and protections given to private firms would further develop 
and stimulated for a competitive local automotive and steel industries.  
 
At the same time, there was no government‘s direct involvement in the 
business. However, after it came clear that this approach was rather unsuccessful 
due to several reasons, among other, failed of an attempt for the localization of 
industries and unattained intention on reduction of economic imbalance between 
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ethnic groups, the Malaysian government later intervened into the industry by 
involving itself in business operations.
87
 According to Taylor (2007: 91), ―since 
the development of sizeable Malay commercial and industrial community would 
took time, the government embarked on establishing and operating Malay 
enterprises, both wholly government-owned and public-private joint-ventures 
through the establishment of statutory corporation such as PERNAS and the State 
Economic Development Corporation (SEDC) and other business ventures under 
the government‘ umbrella‖. This intervention was further strengthened with the 
implementation of policy on heavy industries where the government actively 
involved in the automotive and steel operations through its state-owned 
enterprises. The Malaysian government then provided high protection to these 
enterprises and industries as a whole through policies, under which, provided for 
various kind of incentives and privileges. In analyzing the Malaysian industrial 
policy, Gustafsson (2007: 52) stated that ―Malaysia had used and continued to use 
selective protection instruments in a pro-active way‖. Nevertheless, this 
government-led approach which accompanied by higher government‘s protections 
                                                          
87
 Due to social responsibility after ethnic clash, Malaysian government implemented various 
economic policies under the NEP and national economic plan (Malaysia Plan) to eradicate 
poverty and lessen the economic gap between its indigenous Malay and Chinese. Among them 
was the 30 per cent Bumiputera equity participation in business.   
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fall short as until now the state-owned enterprises remained less competitive or 
marginal and failed to meet national aspiration. The broad government‘s 
involvements in business together with protections given to the industries provide 
a good foundation for me to examine the response made by the Malaysian 
officials‘ and business actors‘ towards the JMEPA.   
  
4.3 Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement (JMEPA) 
4.3.1 Overview of JMEPA 
Initiative to create for an economic partnership between Malaysia and 
Japan was put forward by Prime Minister Mahathir to Japan‘s Prime Minister 
Koizumi during their meeting on 12 December 2002. Preparatory work to 
establish the Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership (JMEP) commenced in 
February 2003 with the formation of Working Groups (WGs) followed by the 
establishment of Joint Study Group (JSG) which involved government officials‘, 
representatives of trade and industry and academicians to deeply discuss and 
expedite the realization of the JMEPA.  
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According to the JSG‘s Report 2003, ―based on the outcomes of the WGs, 
the JSG addressed a wide range of issues of the JMEP including (a) issues on 
liberalization and facilitation of trade in goods and services and investment, 
business environment enhancement as well as issues on cooperation in various 
areas, with a view to examine ways to enhance mutually beneficial economic 
partnership between Japan and Malaysia, by taking into account the necessity of 
flexibility for sensitivity; and (b) analysis on the economic impact of the JMEP‖ 
(MOFA, 2003b: 3). ―The JSG also discussed an across-the-board range of issues 
to be included in the possible scope of negotiations. As a result of the discussions, 
both sides achieved greater understanding of each other‘s position on a variety of 
issues, including the sensitive sectors in each country‖.88  
 
Subsequent to the JSG‘s report, the Prime Ministers of Malaysia and Japan 
agreed on 11 December 2003, to commence for formal negotiations. The JMEP 
involved 9 Rounds of negotiations (of which the last 3 negotiations were the High 
Level meetings), within two years from 13 January 2004 to 22 Mei 2005.
89
 ―The 
                                                          
88
 ibid. 
89
 MITI‘s document on JMEPA (unpublished). 
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agreement in principle was reached on 25 May 2005 between the Prime Minister 
of Malaysia and the Prime Minister of Japan on the key elements of the 
JMEPA‖.90 The JMEPA was officially signed on 13 December 2005. ―The 
JMEPA marked a new era for the Japan-Malaysia strategic partnership, by forging 
close economic relations through cooperation, liberalization and facilitation in 
trade and investment between the two countries‖.91  
 
4.3.2 Outcome of the JMEPA 
The Agreement which came into force on 13 July 2006 covered the FTA 
component which included ―trade in industrial and agricultural goods, trade in 
services, investment, rules of origin, customs procedures, standards and 
conformance, intellectual property, competition policy, enhancement of business 
environment, safeguard measures and dispute settlement as well as cooperation in 
areas such as agriculture, forestry and commodities, education, human resource 
development, information and communication technology (ICT), small and 
                                                          
90
Information on Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement (JMEPA) from 
http://www.miti.gov.my/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.section.Section_5451c5df-c0a8156f
-2af82af8-a1ebb9df&rootid=com.tms.cms.section.Section_8ab48a0a-7f000010-72f772f7-4dc6
2890 
91
 Joint Press Statement of JMEPA, 13 December 2005. 
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medium enterprises, science and technology, tourism and environment‖.92 For the 
industrial goods, both countries would employed a phasing-out period for tariffs 
reduction and elimination which was based on products/items categorization such 
as early-harvest, normal-track, sensitive and highly-sensitive products. Generally, 
tariffs on essentially all goods (including the automotive and steel products) 
would be reduced or eliminated within 10 years from the date of the entry into 
force of the JMEPA. Details of the tariff reduction are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7: Tariff Reduction in Auto, Auto Components and Parts and Steel 
in Malaysia under JMEPA 
Products/Items Tariff Reduction 
Completely Knocked Down 
(CKD) 
 Import duties will be immediately 
eliminated on the date of entry into 
force of the JMEPA 
Auto components and parts 
 Import duties will be 5-30% in 2007, 
0-5% in 2008 and 2009, and 
eliminated in 2010. 
Completely Built Up (CBU) 
(i) For passenger cars 
exceeding 3,000cc. 
 
(ii) For passenger cars 
exceeding 2,000cc, 
 
 
 Import duties will be 20% in 2007, 
0-5% in 2008 and 2009, and 
eliminated in 2010. 
 Import duties will be gradually 
eliminated by 2010. 
                                                          
92
 Information on JMEPA retrieved from 
http://www.miti.gov.my/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.section.Section_5451c5df-c0a8156f
-2af82af8-a1ebb9df 
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Products/Items Tariff Reduction 
Multi-Purpose Vehicles 
(MPVs) exceeding 
3,000cc, trucks exceeding 
20 tonnes and buses. 
 
(iii) For all others CBU other 
than (i) and (ii). 
 
 
 
 
 
 Import duties will be gradually 
eliminated by 2015. 
 
Iron and steel 
 Import duties on essentially all iron 
and steel products will be eliminated 
within 10 years. 
 
 Import duties exemption will be 
granted for Japanese products which 
are directly used in the manufacturing 
activities
93
 subject to the following 
conditions: 
(i)  The  products are not produced 
locally; 
(ii) The products whose specification, 
grade or quantity are not 
available locally; or 
(iii) The products whose specification, 
grade or quantity does not meet a 
user‘s requirement. 
    Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Malaysia. 
 
                                                          
93 The specific sectors to be granted import duty exemption include automotive and components, 
electrical and electronics, shipbuilding and ship-repairing, petroleum and gas, steel furniture, 
canning, re-rolling activities and galvanized iron for construction and home appliances. 
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4.3.3 Negotiation Process of JMEPA 
As previously mentioned, formal negotiations of the JMEPA started in 
December 2003 which involved 9 Rounds of negotiations between negotiators as 
well as ministers from both countries. These negotiations took less than two years 
to be completed, from 13 January 2004 to 22 Mei 2005. Before starting to explore 
and negotiate for an FTA with Japan, the Malaysian side first sought for the 
Cabinet approval/decision for the proposed bilateral FTA. On 5 June 2002, the 
Malaysian Cabinet decided that the country would enter into negotiations with 
Japan towards concluding Malaysia-Japan FTA. Based on this mandate, various 
preparatory works were done including a thorough study of cost and benefits of 
the possible FTA. A Steering Committee was established to examine Malaysia‘s 
interests and concerns in pursuing an FTA with Japan.  
 
The study conducted by this Committee indicated that ―in the long term, 
controlled and phased market liberalization for the Japanese products, services 
and investments could contributed towards enhancing the competitiveness of the 
Malaysian industries. However, in the short to medium term, Japan could gain 
more from the liberalization elements of the FTA as its industries were more 
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developed than those in Malaysia‖.94 The study also stressed that ―Malaysia 
would also benefit through strengthening technical cooperation and capacity 
building to address areas such as technical standards, Human Resource 
Development (HRD), Research and Development (R&D) and technical assistance 
programmes‖.95 The study further recommended that ―Malaysia to adopt the 
Closer Economic Partnership (CEP) approach toward strengthening 
Malaysia-Japan cooperation whereby to secure Japan‘s commitments in areas 
related to facilitation, technical cooperation and capacity building‖. 96  These 
signified that the intensified global competition makes it imperative for Malaysia 
to explore all avenues to enhance its competitive position and the CEP with Japan 
would contribute towards meeting this objective. 
 
The first meeting to discuss the JMEPA was held on 13 January 2003 in 
Putrajaya, Malaysia. The meeting agreed on the framework of the negotiations for 
the JMEPA which comprise of the basic principles, structure and scope of 
                                                          
94 MITI. Report on ―Proposal for Malaysia-Japan Free Trade Agreement/Closer Economic 
Partnership‖ (unpublished). 
95
 ibid. 
96
 ibid. 
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negotiations. Key elements of the framework include:
97
 
 There should be comprehensive and substantial liberalization of trade, 
consistent with the WTO; and 
 Negotiations would take into account flexibility for sensitive sectors; scope of 
negotiation does not include government procurement, however compromise 
was achieved by making the scope on trade and investment related issues 
non-exhaustive. 
 
The approved framework provided the basic principles, scopes, structures 
and guidelines of the negotiation process towards realizing the early conclusion of 
the economic partnership agreement (EPA) between Malaysia and Japan. 
Although the JMEPA was not required for a long time to be concluded, there still 
a lot of contentious issues cropped up along the one year negotiation process. As 
the Japanese main interest was to open-up the Malaysian industrial market, Japan 
tried the best to urge the Malaysian side to liberalize the domestic market 
especially for the automotive and steel sectors which were regarded as key 
                                                          
97  Government document (unpublished). ―Updates to MITI‘s Secretary General on 
Malaysia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement‖. January 2004. 
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industries for Malaysia. This attempt unease Malaysia as these two sectors still 
received numerous protections from the government. For Japan, there remained an 
impression that an EPA with Malaysia was seen to be easier to conclude than that 
with other ASEAN countries, particularly with Thailand that they had ongoing 
discussions.
98
 Moreover, despite a high protection provided to industrial sectors, 
agricultural sector were not protected by the government except certain products 
that were mainly serve for self-sufficient purposes such as rice. Therefore, for 
Japanese side, negotiations with Malaysian might be easier compared to 
Thailand.
99
 
 
   In negotiating for the JMEPA, both countries adopted a single 
undertaking concept where agreement could only be reached if everything was 
agreed across the sectors. That was to say that an agreement would not solely 
consist of tariff cuts and tariff reductions on certain products but must also 
addressed services, investment, economic cooperation and so forth. In this 
manner, ―since countries had to negotiate simultaneously on both sectors that 
                                                          
98
 Japan faced difficulties in negotiating for agriculture sector with Thailand as Thailand keen to 
have more market access for its competitive agriculture products while Japan highly protected 
its agriculture sector. 
 
99
 Thailand was a major rice exporter from ASEAN countries. 
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were highly competitive and those that were much weaker, they could made deals 
and concessions that involved unrelated products and multiple sectors‖ (Higashi, 
2008: 17). This concept gave advantage to both sides as they could reach for an 
agreement which had elements of a win-win situation.  
 
4.4 Government Official’s Preference in the Negotiation Process  
Government officials especially the negotiators and policy makers
100
 had 
their respective significant roles in negotiating and preparing for the FTA‘s 
agreement. In case of the JMEPA, both negotiators and policy makers worked 
closely to keep national interests along the negotiation process of the JMEPA. In 
addition to this, ministers also played an important role along the negotiation 
process.  
 
With the backdrop of developing and enhancing competitiveness of the 
key industries especially the automotive and steel industries, the Japanese quest 
for market liberalization for industrial goods was received in a mixed manner. On 
one hand, Malaysia was constricted with the national economic agenda to develop 
                                                          
100
 Policy makers were those directly responsible for industrial policy‘s formulation.  
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local industries by continuously maintained government protections, and on the 
other hand, Malaysia perceived that local industries‘ competitiveness could be 
achieved through market liberalization by way of competition. In the JMEPA, 
various officials from various departments and ministries were involved in the 
negotiation process. However in the light of the industrial sectors especially the 
automotive and steel sectors, the officials mainly came from MITI and its 
agencies including Malaysia Industrial Development Authority (MIDA). As an 
authority which was tasked to develop local industries and promote the 
international trade, MITI now had the dual role to play. At the earlier stage of the 
JMEPA, the officials tried their best to ensure that local industries would be 
protected and not severely injured, even if the government had to liberalize the 
market. Before the negotiation started, one of MITI senior officers warned that 
Japanese METI might be taking a strong position that any FTA‘s possibility 
would inextricably linked to Malaysia‘s policies on the automotive sector as in 
Tokyo Mini-Ministerial meeting, Japan had raised the issue of alleged 
‗discriminatory treatment‘ to foreign producers in respect of the excise duties 
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imposed by Malaysia. Therefore, he suggested that ―adequate preparations though 
were vital to ensure that any outcome was mutually beneficial‖.101  
 
During the JMEPA‘s negotiation, ―a high amount of considerations was 
given to the current industrial policies to avoid or minimize the effects to local 
industries, and MITI in fact wrote and mentioned to the Cabinet in the MITI‘s 
Cabinet Paper on the need to protect local industries‖. 102  The Malaysian 
negotiators also explained to the Japanese negotiators on why the government 
needed to continue retaining the current industrial policies which was imperative 
for the development of the local industries especially the automotive and steel 
sectors. For Malaysia, these two sectors had utilized huge government‘s 
investments and there was vital for the government to continuously develop the 
sectors. MITI‘s Minister, Rafidah Aziz, admitted that the Malaysian government 
provided a lot of protections to PROTON since the establishment of this national 
carmaker and the government with all the possible would assist the company and 
                                                          
101 Report from Minister Counselor (Economy), MITI Tokyo, 22 April 2003. 
 
102
 Interview conducted with Dato‘Abdul Ghafar Musa, Senior Director Entrepreneur 
Development Division which was previously became the MITI‘s Lead negotiators for JMEPA. 
Putrajaya, Malaysia. 10 March 2010.  
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provide protection within limit allowed by the WTO.
103
 Furthermore, she stressed 
that in a tariffs determination, in order to protect PROTON, she always instructed 
her officers to prepare price impact stimulation before any changes made to tariff 
in order to ensure that there was a difference between the price of PROTON‘s car 
and the final prize that would be imposed to imported cars.
104
        
 
In conjunction to this, ―the Malaysian negotiators at the same time tried to 
the fullest to defend the protective policies which were vastly questioned by the 
Japanese side‖.105 In the early stage of the negotiations, the Japanese government 
requested the Malaysian government to submit various legal grounds (guideline, 
law and standard of permission) and detailed information such as on remissions 
for national car makers, excise duties and import duties for CKD and Approval 
Permit (AP) which was required for the importation of CBU‘s car. They also 
requested the Malaysian side to explain the import restriction measures (including 
AP) on each type of steel products and submit the legal ground of the import 
                                                          
103
 Utusan Malaysia. ―Kerajaan beri perlindungan syarikat kereta nasional‖ (Government Granted 
Protection to National Car Companies). 13 March 2005. 
 
104
 ibid. 
 
105 Interview with Dato‘ Abdul Ghafar Musa. 
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duties exemptions on steel products which were consumed by specific seven 
sectors of industries.
106
  
 
Further to the request, Japan continuously urged Malaysia to dismantle all 
imports barriers for the Japanese automotive and steel products. Japan wanted 
Malaysia to abolish/reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers for those two sectors 
including the need for Malaysia to abolish the AP system for the automotive and 
steel sectors or at least make sure that the procedures were not trade restrictive. In 
response to the Japanese demand and with protection of local industries in mind, 
the Malaysian negotiators continuously defended the policies by stating that 
Malaysia‘s position on the automotive policies remained unchanged as policy 
review on the automotive industry was in progress.
107
 Malaysia also expressed its 
stance that the AP system was not a trade restrictive measure but instead was 
being used for the purpose of data collection and to monitor the importation of the 
automobile and the iron and steel products. Furthermore, for policy makers, it was 
                                                          
106 MITI‘s Document (unpublished). The 7 qualified sectors and products for import duties 
exemption are: automotive and components; electrical and electronics; shipbuilding and ship 
repairing; petroleum and gas; steel furniture; exporting companies and manufacturers located in 
Free Trade Zones (FTZs)/Licensed Manufacturing Warehouse (LMW). 
 
107 Malaysia had come out with the National Automotive Policy (NAP) on 22 March 2006.  
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impossible for the Malaysian government to rapidly open up the local automotive 
and steel market as the industries still at very early stage compared to Japan and it 
required few decades for Malaysia to reach maturity in both industries. Therefore, 
elimination/reduction of tariff for Malaysian iron and steel products required a 
longer time period and the elimination/reduction need to be done on gradual basis 
to ensure the survival of the industries.       
 
The continued pressures made by the Japanese negotiators for Malaysia to 
reconsider its industrial protective measures and the eagerness of the Malaysian 
negotiators to maintain its stance on several protective policies on the automotive 
and steel sectors, created difficulties on the negotiation process of the JMEPA. ―In 
EPA negotiations with Malaysia, Malaysia‘s National Car Policy was an obstacle 
to negotiations over removing a tariff on imported Japanese automobiles‖ 
(Higashi, 2008: 12). Therefore, according to Mr. Ghafar, ―when there were 
difficulties in making a decision, the negotiators then would break-off the 
negotiation to get information before it was resumed‖.108  
 
                                                          
108
 Interview conducted on 23 March 2010. 
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To overcome the difficulties faced by the negotiating team and to 
accelerate the negotiations, MITI‘s Minister, Rafidah Aziz intervened in the 
process. A Ministerial-level meeting was held between Rafidah and Japanese 
Economy, Trade and Industry Minister, Shoici Nakagawa on 22 May 2005 in 
Kuala Lumpur to dismantle deadlock on several contentious issues faced between 
both negotiating teams. At their joint-press conference, Rafidah told that ―both of 
them had tied the loose strings in the JMEPA‖.109 The news reported that the 
JMEPA was finalized, with differences over issues involving the automotive and 
steel sectors being resolved. However, it was reported that both ministers declined 
to elaborate on the consensus reached instead said that it was a ―win-win 
situation‖. Previously both Ministers had met during Rafidah‘s trade mission to 
Japan on April 2005 and it was reported that Nakagawa had told Rafidah on the 
need to swiftly resolved issues that impeded the negotiation of the JMEPA. He 
suggested that both of them needed to ask and instruct their respective officers to 
find a way out for issues that could be resolved while for those that could not be 
resolved among them, it would be discussed at the ministerial level.
110
 
                                                          
109
 The Star. ―Tokyo and KL finalise deal‖. 23 May 2005. 
 
110
 Berita Harian. ―Malaysia-Jepun hampir setuju selesai isu JMEPA‖ (Malaysia-Japan almost 
agree to settle JMEPA’s issues) . 23 April 2005. 
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Subsequent to this, Rafidah ―realized that instructions from the minister to 
bureaucrats would be necessary for negotiations to proceed. Following the 
meeting, ―the Minister instructed bureaucrats and negotiations proceeded rapidly 
thereafter‖ (Higashi, 2008: 15). Rafidah was also reported as said that ―I actually 
did not believe that what Japan requested was something that we could not gave. 
We want Japan to invest more in our automotive sector‖.111  
 
Therefore, at the later stage of the negotiation, after Minister‘s 
instructions, both negotiators tried to find ways on how to have a ―win-win 
outcome‖ for both countries. In line with Malaysia‘s efforts to further enhance 
competitiveness of the automotive industry and it request on cooperation in 
automotive, Japan agreed to provide support in the form of cooperation and 
capacity building for Malaysia. The cooperation included the expert collaboration 
programme, the automotive skill training programme, the business development 
programme and the export promotion cooperation. In exchange for these 
cooperations, Malaysia agreed to commit for market access improvement for the 
                                                          
111
 Berita Harian. ―TK, Tokyo harus elak isu jejas FTA‖ (TK, Tokyo should avoid issues affecting 
FTA). 27 April 2005. 
 
145 
 
Japanese goods. However, given the need to protect the national carmakers, 
Malaysia pledged to gradually eliminate tariffs on finished vehicles below 2000 
cc by 2015 as these vehicles would directly compete with cars manufactured by 
the Malaysian national carmakers, PROTON and PEROUA.
112
 Further, this 
mutual understanding between both sides accelerated the negotiation process of 
the JMEPA.  
 
Strong government officials‘ preference to continuously foster the 
automotive and steel sectors by means of continuous protection was obvious in 
the JMEPA case. The preference was consistently carried out along the 
negotiation process of the JMEPA. This constant preference yielded for a solid 
mandate (continuous protection) which further negatively influenced the 
negotiation process by making it difficult and unsmooth. As compared to 
Thailand, the solid stance was easier to be made by the Malaysian government as 
the authority for the development of the industries and the promotion of trade 
                                                          
112
 Information cited from Kyodo News. just-auto.com editorial team. JAPAN: Japanese and 
Malaysian governments agree major elements of free trade pact. 25 May 2005. Retrieved from 
http://www.just-auto.com/news/japanese-and-malaysian-governments-agree-major-elements-of
-free-trade-pact_id73814.aspx 
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were given to a single ministry i.e MITI. This position facilitated the coordination 
between industrial policy and trade policy in the decision making process of the 
JMEPA which in turn gave weight to the past protective industrial policies which 
aimed for continued protection of the local automotive and steel industries.  
                       
4.5 Societal Actor’s Influence on the Negotiation Process  
Societal actors play an important role in assisting government in policies‘ 
formulation including trade policy on FTA. The societal actors especially business 
group/association had vast experiences and better knowledge on their own 
business or industry and what was best for them. As the JMEPA in particular and 
FTA in general, promoted for market liberalization, business groups that 
represented the import-competing industries would normally oppose those 
agreement as it would injured their business. However, in the JMEPA‘s case, 
there was no significant role played by business groups in opposing the deal as 
compared to the Thai case. This could be explained through the policy 
formulation process undertaken by the Malaysian government. In Malaysia, 
before any policy was formulated, consultation with private sectors was held to 
gather input and also to know their concern on proposed policies. In view of 
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industrial and international trade policies where MITI acted as the main 
coordinator, private sectors were invited to participate in the MITI Annual 
Dialogues. During the Dialogue, business associations presented their concerns on 
industry or trade issues which created problem to their business and made 
recommendation to government to resolve the issues. According to Jomo (2007: 
118), ―the institutionalization of consultative dialogues reflects the government‘s 
commitment to be responsive to the views and the needs of the private sector‖. 
This close ‗public-private‘ relationship resulted to orderly manage of opposition 
efforts (if any), made by local industrial player or business groups towards the 
JMEPA.  
 
In support, the Trade Policy Review of the WTO also stated that ―the 
practice of Malaysia‘s trade and broader economic policy involved an increasing 
degree of transparency and consultation. Important policy initiatives were 
preceded by extensive consultations with affected sectors and other 
stakeholders‖.113 The WTO‘s Report further stated that ―representatives from the 
business sector, academia, and NGOs including several interest groups were 
                                                          
113
WTO Trade Policy Review. WT/TPR/S/156. www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s156-2_e.doc 
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members of the various task forces, and committees chaired by the MITI Minister. 
MITI also incorporates the views and inputs received into the policy formulation 
process‖. 114  Therefore, the inclusions of all interested parties in policy 
formulation led to accountability and acceptability of the said policy by general 
public.  
 
In the case of the JMEPA, societal actors especially industrial players, 
businesses and industries associations and other interested parties were invited 
and fully involved before and along the negotiation process of JMEPA‖.115 MITI 
conducted meetings with various industrial players including business groups 
before making any decision for the JMEPA‘s negotiations. For example, on 10 
July 2003, MITI conducted a meeting on FTAs (including the JMEPA) to discuss 
issues
116
 which had impact on the automotive industries. Prior to this, a survey on 
‗feedback on the proposed JMEPA‘ was sent to all related business groups such as 
Malaysian Automotive Association (MAA), PROTON Vendors Association, 
                                                          
114
WTO Trade Policy Review. WT/TPR/S/156. www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s156-2_e.doc 
 
115
 Dato‘ Abdul Ghafar Musa. Interview conducted on 10 March 2010. 
 
116
 Issues that were put into consideration are tariff reduction, non-tariff barriers and sensitive 
products (identification of products to be protected/excluded from FTA).  
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Motorcycle & Scooter Assemblers Association of Malaysia (MASAAM), 
PERODUA Vendors Club and Persatuan Pengimport dan Peniaga Kenderaan 
Melayu Malaysia (PEKEMA) to collect their views on the JMEPA. In addition to 
this, ―main business/industries associations were also asked to standby outside the 
negotiation room to be ready for any input should it be immediately needed by the 
negotiators‖.117 For Malaysia, any stance made along the negotiation process was 
not the governments‘ alone decision but rather its incorporated views of local 
industrial players and business groups. Therefore, according to Mr. Ghafar, ―there 
was no reason for the industries to oppose the JMEPA as what consisted in the 
agreement was already consulted and agreeable by them‖.  
 
Besides the consultations organized by the government, the industrial 
players including main industries association/business group also conducted 
briefing to the government officials to explain and update the government on their 
business situation and supports needed by them to move forward. Based on inputs 
given by the industries, the policy makers then negotiated and formulated policies 
                                                          
117
 Dato‘ Abdul Ghafar Musa. Interview conducted on 10 March 2010. 
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which had both elements; protection elements as well as elements to enhance the 
industries competitiveness under the JMEPA.  
 
Therefore, it could be summed that the wide involvement of industrial 
players and business groups in Malaysia‘s trade policy formulation process had 
effectively minimized dissatisfaction and opposition towards the JMEPA. Due to 
this, there were not much lobbying efforts made by the industries/business groups 
to put pressure on the government to continue to protect the local industries. 
According to Minister Rafidah, ―the Malaysian private sectors now understand the 
need to cooperate through joint-venture and efforts to make Malaysia as a 
manufacturing hub for Japanese companies‖.118  
 
Echoed itself with the Minister‘s statement, MAA stated that ―Malaysian 
industry players must look at the opportunities that would arise and try to benefit 
from any FTA‖.119 It was further stated that ―the majority of local auto industry 
players were currently tied with Japanese manufacturers and were already 
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 Berita Harian. ―Malaysia, Jepun atasi kebuntuan perkongsian‖ (Malaysia, Japan resolved 
cooperation’s dead end) . 23 May 2005. 
 
119
 The Star Online. Star-Motoring. ―Cheaper cars?‖. 3 July 2005.  
   http://star-motoringcom/news/story.asp?file=/2005/7/3/ms_features/1 
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enjoying sourcing of components under the CEPT rates from ASEAN which 
means that there was little impact on the total Malaysian auto industries‖.120 On 
the other hand, according to the MAA, there was likely being ―more opportunities 
for more Japanese investment in making components in Malaysia‖.121  
    
Despite close relations between the private sectors and the government 
during the policy formulation on the JMEPA, there were still little opposition and 
dissatisfaction existed on the JMEPA. The Malaysian auto parts vendors 
expressed their concerned that further incentives for the Japanese manufacturers 
would hurt the domestic market and urged the government to limit the incentives 
for CBU vehicles of more than 3,000cc. Furthermore, the groups stated that the 
entry of more CBU vehicles would not give advantage to the Malaysian auto parts 
makers as it would not generate more business.
122
 This concern was echoed by 
the National Automobile Distributor (EON). EON‘s Managing Director expressed 
that ―there should be a national agenda in the FTAs to enable local players, 
                                                          
120 The Star Online. Star-Motoring. ―Cheaper cars?‖. 3 July 2005.  
   http://star-motoringcom/news/story.asp?file=/2005/7/3/ms_features/1 
 
121
 ibid. 
122
 The Star. ―Motor players to gain from Malaysia-Japan FTA‖. 28 May 2005. 
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especially the vendors (parts and component suppliers) in the motor industry to 
grow. According to him, whatever the final details of the FTAs were, they must 
not stifle the growth of PROTON‖.123  
 
Concern was also made by PROTON Adviser, Tun Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad.
124
 He was reported as saying that the influx of imported cars without 
control would give big impact to local automotive industries especially 
PROTON‘s markets, which for him would be shrinking.125 The MITI‘s Minister 
later responded by stated that MITI never abandoned the national automotive 
industry by approving imports of foreign cars without limit
126
 and in fact MITI 
was always gave a lot of considerations to the national automotive industry 
aligned with the policy fixed by the government.
127
 In relation to this, the Prime 
                                                          
123 The Star Online. Star-Motoring. ―Cheaper cars?‖ 3 July 2005. 
 
124
 This critique however was coincided with AP‘s issue where he alleged that MITI, in particular 
Rafidah had abused and approved for a big number of APs for imported cars which 
undermined Proton.  
 
125
 Utusan Malaysia. ―Kedudukan kereta nasional dicabar‖ (National car’s position was 
challenged) . 26 May 2005. 
 
126
 Imports of foreign CBU cars required AP which would be based on 10 percent from total 
production of local passengers and commercial cars.  
  
127
 Utusan Malaysia. ―Kementerian tidak abai industry automotif negara – Rafidah‖ (Ministry not 
neglect national automotive industry- Rafidah). 29 May 2005. 
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Minister, Datuk Seri Abdulah Ahmad Badawi also stated that ―national car 
makers had to start competing with other manufacturers and not expect the 
government to protect them indefinitely‖.128 The dissatisfactions from business 
groups and Proton‘s adviser however rose after the negotiation was concluded and 
the agreement was agreed in principle. 
 
Although import-competing industries normally opposed for trade 
liberalization, the JMEPA‘s case proved that this thought is not necessarily right 
as the same industries would also support the FTA if correct approach and clear 
benefit perceived by them. In the JMEPA it was also clear that though the market 
was monopolized by few companies (such as PROTON, PERODUA and 
PERWAJA), insignificant opposition efforts from industrial players and business 
groups prevailed as government‘s interests coexisted within the industries. Due to 
this, the industries‘ concerns were transmitted through the governments‘ response 
towards the JMEPA (resisted to dismantle the protective policies). In addition, the 
proper approach undertook by the Malaysian government by involving the 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
128
 New Straits Times. ―Protection of Proton not indefinite‖. 2 June 2005. The Prime Minister also 
reported as stood by MITI‘s Minister explanation on AP policy that the system was keeping 
Proton alive, and doing away with it would be ―disastrous‖ to Proton. 
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industries in policy making process further alleviated any negative reaction or 
opposition from these groups towards the JMEPA.         
  
4.6 Conclusion 
Malaysia had implemented various industrial policies in developing its 
industries. As the government had largely developed the industries through state 
initiatives or state involvements, various protective measures which accompanied 
with the industrial policies were adapted to further foster the industries. Among 
protective policies implemented by the government includes import ban, import 
tariffs, local content requirement, tax exemptions, mandatory deletion programme, 
and AP requirements. The introduction of the heavy industry policy further 
enhanced government‘s protections on the automotive and steel industries by 
means of the protective industrial policies. The government‘s interest and the 
Bumiputera policy agenda which was largely attached and implemented along 
with the industrial policies made imperative for the government to continuously 
retain the current industrial policies along the negotiation process of the JMEPA.  
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With backdrop of the domestic industrial development agenda, 
government officials tried to their fullest to retain the protective industrial policies 
on the automotive and steel industries in negotiating for trade agreement on 
industrial goods under the JMEPA. Compared to Thailand, this policy preference 
of the officials was consistent along the negotiation process of the JMEPA. In 
addition, the solid stance of the Malaysian government was able to be formed as 
coordination between industrial policy and trade policy was done by a single 
authority i.e MITI which lessen any possibilities for a diverge stance among the 
authorities. The persistence preference of the officials and the concrete stance 
made on the JMEPA further made the negotiation process rocky. 
 
 Despite government officials‘ influence on the negotiation process of the 
JMEPA, there was no significant role played by the industrial players and 
business groups in lobbying the government to retain current industrial policies 
along the negotiation process of the JMEPA. The close ‗public-private‘ 
relationship between the government and the industries in the policy formulation 
process of the JMEPA also contributed to the minimal opposition efforts made by 
the industrial players and business groups. The agreed trade policy had took into 
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considerations all inputs provided by the industrial players through a continuous 
consultation held with them. Therefore, there were no opposition or resistance 
made by this societal actors along the negotiation process of the JMEPA as they 
were fully aware of the proposed agreement which already incorporated their 
interests.   
 
 Past industrial policies and its nature also linked to the government 
officials‘ and societal actors‘ responses towards the JMEPA. Number of 
protective industrial policies on auto and steel sectors increased after the 
involvement of the Malaysian government in those particular sectors. These 
policies which most were formulated and implemented by MITI has made the 
officials persisted to retain them in the JMEPA‘s negotiation in order to 
continuously protect and develop the auto and steel industries which were 
considered unready for stiff competition. In addition, MITI officials also insisted 
to maintain the policies as social agenda (Bumiputera policy) was attached onto 
most of those policies. If the policies be removed it would gave negative impact to 
the national social economic objectives which were to eliminate economic 
disparities and to form national unity among Malaysian ethnics. The vested 
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government‘s interests in the industries also made it imperative for the officials to 
continuously protect those sectors as huge investment and sources were endowed 
to both sectors. On the other hand, the nature of past policies (protective policies 
which favored state-owned companies) discouraged private investments. This 
situation further gave disadvantage to the industries and created for a weak 
business foundation with no voice to express their concern.   
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis tried to highlight responses made by two Southeast Asian 
governments - Thailand and Malaysia, and their industries towards FTA‘s 
negotiations in relation to past industrial policies adopted by both governments. 
My previous two empirical chapters started with a brief description on industrial 
policies adopted by Thailand and Malaysia in order to answer my first research 
question on what kind of industrial policies are adopted by Southeast Asian 
countries. Following this, a brief account of JTEPA and JMEPA were provided, 
and analyses on government officials‘ preference and societal actors‘ response in 
relation to automotive and steel sectors were carried out to observe on how past 
policy trend to foster both sectors influenced the negotiation process of JTEPA 
and JMEPA. As this research come to an end, I will first summarize findings for 
each case based on my research questions and hypothesis and finally I will 
conclude this chapter with suggestions on areas for future research.    
    
5.1 Industrial policies Adopted by Thailand and Malaysia 
From this research, I found that Thailand and Malaysia had undergone a 
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similar industrialization process since 1960s, both under ISI and EOI. With this 
process, both countries established an administrative agencies agency to deal with 
industrial development such as BOI in Thailand and MIDA in Malaysia. At the 
same time, various industrial policies which applied according to industrial 
sectors were adopted such as Pioneer Industrial Ordinance, Investment Incentives 
Act, Industrial Coordination Act and Industrial Promotion Act. Policy on heavy 
industries was also espoused in Malaysia in concurrence with state‘s involvement. 
The implementation of industrial policies was outlined in respective national 
economic development plans as well as industrial master plans of both countries. 
Further to this, specific policies on the automotive and steel sectors adopted by 
Thailand and Malaysia are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8: Industrial Policies in Automobile and Steel Sectors 
Sector Country 
Thailand Malaysia 
Automotive 
 Promotional incentives 
(e.g tax incentives) to 
new assembly plants  
 Restriction on new 
plants 
 Import ban on CBU 
 Import tariffs on CBU 
 Promotional incentives 
(e.g tax incentives) to new 
assembly plants. 
 Local content requirement 
 ‗Mandatory Deletion‘ 
programme 
 Import ban on CBU 
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Sector Country 
Thailand Malaysia 
and CKD 
 Local content 
requirement 
 ‗Mandatory Deletion‘ 
programme 
 Import tariffs on CBU and 
CKD 
 Approval Permit (AP) 
system. 
 Heavy industry policy. 
Steel 
 Promotional incentives 
Restriction on number 
of steel operators 
 Tax exemptions 
 Import tariffs on 
imported steels 
 Additional import 
surcharges 
 Compulsory standard 
 Promotional incentives 
 Tax incentives and 
privileges 
 Import tariffs 
 AP system 
 Import duty exemption on 
seven key sectors 
including automotive. 
 Heavy industry policy 
  Source: Compilation by author from various sources. 
 
These industrial policies were created and enforced aiming to protect and 
foster domestic industries, in particular, automotive and steel sectors. Although 
some of these protective policies were later lifted, several policies still remained 
intact for both countries. Importantly, this research found that even though many 
of the policies seem similar in both Thailand and Malaysia in terms of their name, 
differences existed in terms of the way the policies were implemented. For 
instance, due to its social-economic objectives, Malaysia attached the Bumiputera 
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policy along with its industrial policies (e.g heavy industry policy required for 
Bumiputera managerial skills in the state-owned companies). The exercise of the 
Bumiputera policy along with the industrial policies differentiated Malaysia from 
Thailand. Further, an approach to implementing the policies also differed. This 
can be explained through the nature of those policies implemented by both 
governments. The implementation of industrial policies based on the private-led 
model in Thailand, provided opportunity for the private sector to dominate the 
industry, which in turn created strong and competitive local automotive and steel 
industries. By contrast, Malaysia‘s approach which was based on the 
government-led model with extensive state involvement in the automotive and 
steel sectors, inevitably felled short as until now state-owned enterprises remained 
less competitive or marginal and failed to meet national aspiration. Abbott (2004: 
65) argued that ―different pattern of industrialization reflect distinct political 
pattern where Malaysia‘s internationalist strategy had relied on the capabilities of 
an autonomous, interventionist state, while stronger business influence in 
Thailand had bolstered indigenous capability building‖.  
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Therefore, it is valuable to note that the different way and approach in 
implementing the industrial policies would yield for different consequences. 
Thailand which implemented industrial policies mainly based on economic 
objective and private sector‘s emphasis resulted for competitive local industries. 
Whilst Malaysia which implemented policies based on economic and social 
objectives and government-led emphasis left for a marginal and uncompetitive 
industries which continuously relied on government‘s protection for their 
endurance. The objectives and nature of past industrial policies further established 
the different setting of the government and local industries‘ foundation which then 
acted differently in both FTA cases (JTEPA and JMEPA).  
 
5.2 Government Official’s Preference in the Negotiation Process of an FTA 
Government officials played an important role in any FTAs negotiations 
where they were obliged to keep for their national interest. Therefore, preferences of 
these officials together with the mandate to continuously foster strategic industrial 
sectors crafted their manner towards the negotiation process of an FTA. The summary 
of my research finding on influence of government officials‘ preference in the 
negotiation process of the JTEPA and JMEPA is shown in following Table 9.  
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Table 9: Government Officials’ Preference towards JTEPA and JMEPA 
Country/FTA Influence on 
Negotiation process 
Government Officials 
Preference 
Thailand (JTEPA) 
Unsmooth & 
Chaotic 
Oppose & 
Support 
Malaysia (JMEPA) Unsmooth Oppose 
 
My analysis on government officials‘ preference revealed that this factor 
has direct influences in the negotiation process of both FTAs by making the 
process unsmooth and chaotic. Preferences to retain past industrial policies in 
order to continuously foster domestic industries forced the officials to oppose the 
JTEPA and JMEPA. In contrast, the higher-ranking officials, in Thailand, were 
found supporting the agreement similarly with the aim to foster the domestic 
industries rather through stiff competition brought by FTAs. Nevertheless, policy 
preferences of high-ranking officials dominated the scene and highly influenced 
the negotiation process. This preference was associated with previous 
liberalization efforts made by Thailand which started in 1991 and further 
enhanced in 2000. The endeavor to make Thailand as a regional hub or ‗Detroit of 
Asia‘ for automotive production also drove preference of high-ranking officials to 
support the JTEPA.  
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For Malaysia, the unyielding preference to retain past industrial policies 
in the name of industrial protection was further linked to Malaysian national 
economic agenda which was based on socio-economic restructuring after a racial 
clash in May 1969. The Bumiputera policy which emerged after this incident and 
is largely attached to the industrial policies has made imperative for the Malaysian 
officials to prefer to retain past industrial policies to ensure that the national 
economic and social objectives could be achieved. This social economic agenda 
(Bumiputera policy) differentiated Malaysia from Thailand and explained why 
Malaysia was keen to maintain past policies as it had two goals to be achieved 
(economic equality and prosperity and social unity). Further, the government 
officials perceived that economic prosperity would only be achieved if economic 
disparities between races can be ceased.      
 
In addition, a solid stance to continue to protect the automotive and steel 
sectors in the JMEPA‘s negotiation was easier to be made by the Malaysian officials as 
compared to the Thais officials (in JTEPA) as cohesion and coordination in policy 
making process existed among the officials. These conditions were found lacking in 
Thailand which resulted in divergence stances made by its officials towards the JTEPA.  
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Furthermore, it was observed that the nature of past industrial policies 
(whether based on private-led or government-led development) was also linked to 
responses made by government officials towards JTEPA and JMEPA. In case of 
Thailand, as the business development was left in the hand of private sectors and 
minimal government involvement, the government officials, especially 
high-ranking officials, were less keen to maintain current protective industrial 
policies along the negotiation process of JTEPA. However, dissimilarity 
materialized in Malaysia‘s case. With the extensive involvement of the state in the 
economic development due to social agenda as explained before, the government 
officials made the fullest efforts to retain protective industrial policies in order to 
foster the strategic sectors and at the same time to fulfill their social agenda for 
economic equality and social unity.     
     
5.3 Societal Actor’s Influence on the Negotiation Process of an FTA 
Societal actors in particular from import-competing industries normally 
would negatively respond to any FTA deal. However, in this research, I found that 
different responses emerged in both cases. The result of my analysis is shown in 
Table 10.  
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Table 10: Societal Actors’ Response towards JTEPA and JMEPA  
Country/FTA 
Societal Actors (Industrial 
players & Business groups/ 
associations) 
Influence on 
Negotiation process 
Thailand 
(JTEPA) 
Strongly oppose Unsmooth 
Malaysia  
(JMEPA) 
Not oppose Smooth 
 
In case of JTEPA, strong oppositions were voiced out by industrial 
players and business groups/associations against the deal. Extensive lobbying 
efforts were made by these societal actors to pressure the government to protect 
their interests by retaining past industrial policies. These efforts instituted 
significant influence on the negotiation process of the JTEPA. Strong coalition 
among the industrial players and business groups made possible for them to 
organize the opposition efforts to express their concerns. This business pressure 
also, though unsuccessful to retain current protective policies, managed to urge 
the government to reconsider the proposed option in keeping their interests.
129
   
 
                                                          
129
 The proposed option was to gradually reduce import duties as well as to impose import quotas 
on certain steel imports. 
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Similar opposition efforts were not found in the JMEPA‘s case. My 
analysis on Malaysia revealed that there is no significant role played by societal 
groups in opposing the JMEPA‘s deal due to the government‘s interest in the 
business and the effectiveness of public-private consultation between government 
and societal actors held before and along the negotiation process of the JMEPA. 
Furthermore, there was no reason for industrial players and business groups to 
oppose the JMEPA as their needs and concerns were attended by the government 
and well reflected in the agreement. 
  
Another point to be highlighted is the nature of past industrial policies 
linked to responses made by societal actors towards both FTAs. Strong foundation 
of private sectors in Thailand led to strong business institutions (business 
group/association) that were influential in pressurizing the government. Whilst in 
Malaysia, high government‘s involvement in business led to insubstantial private 
sectors foundation which closely relied on government for their movement.   
 
5.4 Suggestion for Future Research 
 In wrapping my thesis, some ideas and possibilities triggered in my mind 
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that I think worth to be explored for future research. In the findings, I explained 
linkages between trade policies and industrial policies of the Malaysian 
government which was pursued based on its socio-economic agenda at home. Due 
to economic imbalance between ethnic groups, the Malaysian government 
formulated economic policies aimed to reduce and eliminate the disparities by 
concentrating on fostering the certain ethnic groups which were reflected in 
various policies. This relationship between the state and its society worth to be 
observed as characteristics of societies might also influence government external 
policies in other countries. 
 
 Beside that, in conducting my research, I only focused on the defensive side of 
FTAs. Responses were observed from the bird eye view of the import-competing 
industries (the automotive and steel sectors) which relatively opposed for trade 
liberalization brought by FTAs. Different result might emerge if observation is done 
from the offensive side of FTAs i.e responses from export-oriented industries such as 
the textile and agricultural sectors. Hence, another area of interest for future research is 
to look at how the export-oriented industries and those benefited from market 
liberalization, respond to market opportunities offered by FTAs.  
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